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DOES ANALYST INDEPENDENCE SELL INVESTORS SHORT? 
 
Jill E. Fisch
*
 
Regulators responded to the analyst scandals of the late 1990s by imposing 
extensive new rules on the research industry.  These rules include a requirement 
forcing financial firms to separate investment banking operations from research.  
Regulators argued, with questionable empirical support, that the reforms were 
necessary to eliminate analyst conflicts of interest and ensure the integrity of 
sell-side research. 
By eliminating investment banking revenues as a source for funding 
research, the reforms have had substantial effects.  Research coverage of small 
issuers has been dramatically reduced—the vast majority of small capitali-
zation firms now have no coverage at all.  The market for research has become 
increasingly segmented; institutional investors have access to highly sophisticated 
and costly information sources, while retail investors are receiving less 
information than ever. 
This Article argues that these consequences were predictable.  Because 
research is a public good, and quality research cannot be produced at low cost, the 
basic business model of the research industry requires firms to subsidize their 
research operations—especially research that is widely distributed to retail inves-
tors—with other services.  Analysts traditionally used investment banking revenues, 
trading commissions, and proprietary trading to fund their research.  These 
services, in turn, created incentives for analyst optimism.  Mandated independ-
ence does not change this market structure, and high-quality research cannot be 
provided to public investors on a cost-effective basis absent a source of funding. 
This Article proposes an alternative to mandated independence: a disclosure-
based mechanism to manage analyst conflicts of interest.  The Article argues that 
the recent reforms should be replaced by a combination of analyst registration 
and a new model of analyst disclosure through a Securities and Exchange 
                                                                                                                            
 * Visiting Professor, Columbia Law School (Fall 2007); Visiting Professor, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School (Spring 2007); T.J. Maloney Professor of Business Law, Fordham Law 
School, and Director, Fordham Corporate Law Center.  An early version of this Article was 
delivered as the keynote address at the 2005 Corporate Law Teachers’ Association Conference at 
the University of Sydney Faculty of Law.  I am grateful for the many valuable suggestions I 
received at that conference and for the thoughtful commentary provided by Tony D’Aloisio, 
managing director and chief executive officer, Australian Stock Exchange.  I also received helpful 
comments from Henry Hu, Donald Langevoort, Hillary Sale, Kurt Schact, Rob Sitkoff, and 
Richard Squire.  I presented prior drafts at the Symposium on Gatekeepers Today: The Professions 
After the Reforms at Columbia Law School, the Eugene P. and Delia S. Murphy Conference on 
Corporate Law at Fordham Law School, and Georgetown University Law Center, and received 
many useful comments at each session. 
40 55 UCLA LAW REVIEW 39 (2007) 
 
 
Commission Analyst Website (SECAW).  SECAW would enable firms to 
subsidize research while providing the information necessary to allow researchers 
and investors to evaluate the quality of that research.  At the same time, 
SECAW would respond to concerns about segmentation, information access, 
and non-investment-banking conflicts that have not been addressed by the 
Global Research Settlement or other regulatory efforts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Several years ago, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer’s revela-
tions of widespread analyst misconduct,1 coupled with the dramatic collapse 
of the technology bubble in the stock market, led to widespread calls for 
increased regulation of research analysts.  The U.S. Congress, the U.S. 
                                                                                                                            
 1. Press Release, Office of N.Y. Att’y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Merrill Lynch Stock Rating 
System Found Biased by Undisclosed Conflicts of Interests (Apr. 8, 2002), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/apr08b_02.html.  The results of the investigation were 
detailed in Petitioner’s Affidavit in Support of Application for an Order Pursuant to Gen. Bus. 
Law Section 354, at 10–13, Spitzer v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 02-401522 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 8, 
2002), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/investors/press/2002/apr/MerrillL.pdf. 
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the self-regulatory 
organizations (SROs) answered the calls by adopting extensive regulatory 
reforms.2  The reforms included required certifications of the views expressed 
in analyst reports, a variety of disclosure requirements, and limitations on 
personal trading by analysts.  Most important, the reforms mandated the 
formal separation of research from investment banking.  The purpose of 
the separation was to reduce conflicts of interest, thereby increasing 
analyst independence. 
The reforms are now in place, and the market has responded.  Whether 
greater independence increases the reliability of analyst research and reduces 
biases is not clear.  Preliminary studies suggest that analyst recommendations 
are less optimistic than they were at the height of the technology boom of 
the late 1990s.  Analyst recommendations remain predominantly positive 
and optimistic, however.  Buy recommendations still dominate the market, 
and sell recommendations are relatively rare.  Moreover, the evidence on 
the quality of sell-side research, both prior and subsequent to the regulatory 
reforms, is far more equivocal, highlighting the distinction between 
research quality and optimism.3 
Even if researchers ultimately can demonstrate that the regulations 
have improved the accuracy of analyst research, the structural changes 
imposed by the regulations have been costly.4  Investment banks have 
reduced their expenditures on analyst research.  Many analysts, particu-
larly the most experienced, fled to investment banking, the buy side, and 
hedge funds.  Analyst coverage, especially for smaller companies, has 
declined dramatically.  Currently, 35 percent of public companies listed on 
the major stock exchanges have no research coverage at all.5  That number 
increases to 83 percent for companies with market capitalizations of less 
than $125 million.6  This decline in research coverage is a critical problem 
for smaller companies, because a lack of research coverage increases capital 
costs.  The initial public offering (IPO) market also has been affected; 
reduced information requires issuers to be larger and better established in 
order successfully to access the public capital markets.  In addition, lack of 
coverage limits retail investor access to profitable investing opportunities. 
                                                                                                                            
 2. See infra Part III (describing the regulatory reforms). 
 3. See infra Parts II, IV (describing empirical studies). 
 4. See infra Part IV (describing market responses to the regulatory changes). 
 5. FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES 
TO THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 65 n.126 (2006), http://www.sec.gov/ 
info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport_d.pdf [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. 
 6. Id. 
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The existing research market has become increasingly segmented.  
Firms are offering new and enhanced services to large institutional clients 
and focusing less on retail investors.7  Research firms are eschewing 
public or even widespread distribution of their research, moving to a 
business model in which information is limited to a small number of 
clients—often hedge funds—who may pay $1 million a year or more for 
exclusive and customized research services.8  Several organizations are 
attempting to fill the void by creating a model of research for hire, in which 
issuers pay for analyst coverage, but the viability of that model remains 
unproven.9  Some critics claim that even the independent research mandate 
of the Global Research Settlement is of little value to investors10—although 
the program has clearly been a success for Morningstar, which is providing 
the lion’s share of the research.11  On the whole, it is uncertain whether 
increased analyst independence has benefited retail investors and the 
capital markets. 
The existing reforms also contain significant gaps.  Although widely 
billed as eliminating analyst conflicts of interest, the reforms focus almost 
exclusively on investment banking conflicts.  True independence would 
require regulators to address brokerage conflicts, soft-dollar commissions, 
proprietary trading (including trading by affiliated mutual funds), and the 
differential treatment of institutional and retail customers.  In addition, 
because most of the recent reforms were imposed through a combination 
of the terms of the Global Research Settlement12 and rules adopted by 
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), they do not apply to all research 
providers.  In particular, analysts who do not work for broker-dealers remain 
                                                                                                                            
 7. See infra notes 182–189 and accompanying text (describing research services targeted 
to institutional clients). 
 8. See, e.g., Monica Schulz, New Firms Push Exclusive Research (Luring Hedge Funds), 
WALL ST. LETTER, Sept. 4, 2006, available at http://www.westlaw.com (search for citation 2006 
WLNR 17089489) (stating that the growth of customized research costs as much as $250,000 to 
$350,000 per quarter and is aimed at hedge fund investors). 
 9. See infra notes 229–250 (describing issuer-paid research). 
 10. See Judith Burns, “Independent” Stock Research Hasn’t Been Must-See, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
26, 2005, at B3. 
 11. See, e.g., Matthew Keenan, Morningstar’s Net Soars as Research Takes Off, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., May 5, 2006, at 19 (explaining that six of ten Wall Street investment banks are buying 
research from Morningstar as part of their obligations under the Global Research Settlement). 
 12. See SEC, Fact Sheet on Global Analyst Research Settlements (Apr. 28, 2003), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm (describing settlement terms); Global Research 
Analyst Settlement Final Judgment Addendum A (approved on Sept. 24, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/finaljudgadda.pdf (describing settlement requirements 
in more detail). 
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largely unregulated.  Extension of the reforms would, of course, generate a 
substantially greater impact on the market. 
This Article argues that the effects of the regulatory reforms were 
predictable.  Mandated independence is inconsistent with the business 
model through which research is provided to retail investors and the 
public.  Because of the high cost of quality research, and because research 
is a public good that offers firms limited ability to recoup its cost, analysts 
have traditionally subsidized research through other business operations, 
using trading commissions, investment banking revenues, and proprietary 
trading to generate profits.  Investment banking operations, for example, 
emerged as a natural way to subsidize research on small public companies 
that would otherwise be unprofitable.  Investment banking also provided 
information that analysts could incorporate into their research.  The recent 
regulatory reforms have eliminated the ability of firms to subsidize research 
through investment banking.  As a result, reducing the so-called analyst 
conflicts has the effect of eliminating a critical source of research funding.  
Even the temporary subsidy provided by the Global Research Settlement 
has not compensated for this effect. 
At the same time, increased independence is unlikely to eliminate 
analyst optimism—the most visible result of investment banking influence.  
Fundamental components of the market for research create incentives 
for optimism, incentives that are fueled by the interests of analysts’ institu-
tional clients and reinforced by issuers.  As a result, the capacity of research 
to mislead the retail investor remains substantial.  Simply put, the inde-
pendence mandate is problematic in terms of its effects on both the quality 
and quantity of information received by investors, particularly retail investors. 
In other work with Stephen Choi, I have proposed an alternative 
source of funding for equity research.13  As we noted in that article, it is 
possible to design structural reforms that allow research, and other services 
that provide value to investors and the market to be funded independently 
of business relationships that create potential conflicts.14  In the absence of 
alternative sources of funding, however, mandated structural reforms to the 
research industry are problematic.  In addition, subsidies directed exclu-
sively to equity research pose challenges in identifying the optimal level 
of research.  Without considering the relative advantages, in an ideal 
world, of the two possible regulatory approaches—structural change versus 
                                                                                                                            
 13. Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal for 
Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269 (2003). 
 14. Id. at 321–23. 
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improved disclosure—this Article develops a disclosure-based alternative to 
mandated independence.15  The premise of this approach is that investors 
can be adequately protected through regulations that manage rather than 
eliminate conflicts of interest.  Toward that end, the Article introduces a 
mechanism for increasing transparency through a combination of analyst 
registration and a dedicated research analyst website. 
Retail investors currently have very limited access to reliable infor-
mation about the analysts whose recommendations they receive through 
the Internet, the media, and other public sources.  Although extensive 
information on research analysts is available, it is not readily accessible to 
small investors.  The government has the ability to address this deficiency.  
The Article proposes that the SEC obtain information about equity 
analysts by imposing a registration requirement on all analysts who 
disseminate their research broadly to the investing public.  The registration 
requirement would require analysts to disclose information about themselves 
and their employers, including personal holdings and potentially conflicting 
business relationships.  In addition, analysts would be required to file publicly 
disseminated research contemporaneously with the SEC.  The SEC would 
make this information available to the public by posting it on a newly 
created SEC Analyst Website, known as SECAW.  SECAW would establish 
a single source through which investors, researchers, and the markets could 
obtain information about analysts’ current and past recommendations and 
coverage decisions and evaluate that information in light of specific factors 
relating to analyst independence. 
SECAW would dramatically expand the information available to the 
investing public.  It would enable retail investors to verify research, identify 
potential conflicts of interest, and evaluate analyst performance.  In addition, 
SECAW would serve as a resource for private service providers and others 
to compile information on analyst performance, to evaluate the effect of 
analyst conflicts, and more.  In particular, SECAW would enable research-
ers to determine the extent to which independence is a good proxy for 
reliability.  Importantly, SECAW would not be limited to addressing 
conflicts of interest, but would offer a new and centralized source of data on 
the overall quality of publicly distributed research. 
                                                                                                                            
 15. The approach developed in this Article is designed primarily to increase information 
flow in the capital markets and to protect retail investors.  As the Article demonstrates, 
institutional and retail investors are not similarly situated with respect to analyst research.  
Institutional customers have sufficient sophistication to detect and evaluate conflicts of interest 
and to protect themselves by contract from conflicts that they view as harmful.  As a result, there 
is no justification for regulators to impose structural limits on these marketplace transactions. 
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Although the filing requirement might seem burdensome, this Article 
argues that, under appropriate conditions, public disclosure of analyst 
research may serve the interests of an analyst’s institutional and issuer 
clients.  In addition, any burden is substantially less than that imposed 
by a restriction on research funding such as the mandated separation of 
investment banking from research.  In sum, the proposal offers a return to 
a market-based mechanism for funding research coupled with the 
transparency that will allow the market itself to evaluate the reliability of 
that research. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes the role of the 
research analyst and the business relationships that firms have used to subsi-
dize the costs of research.  Part II reviews the literature on analyst conflicts 
of interest and considers the extent to which such conflicts have been 
shown to bias analyst recommendations and affect research quality.  Part III 
briefly describes the recent regulatory reforms.  Part IV focuses on the 
effects of the regulatory reforms.  Finally, in Part V, the Article describes its 
proposed alternative—analyst registration and SECAW—and demonstrates 
the superiority of this approach to the current regulatory regime. 
I. THE ROLE OF THE RESEARCH ANALYST 
A. Analysts and What They Do 
Research analysts are financial professionals who research companies 
and create reports and recommendations that are used by traders in making 
investment decisions.16  SEC Regulation Analyst Certification (AC) defines 
a research analyst as “any natural person who is primarily responsible for 
the preparation of the content of a research report.”17  A research report is 
defined as “a written communication (including an electronic commu-
nication) that includes an analysis of a security or an issuer and provides 
information reasonably sufficient upon which to base an investment decision.”18  
Analysts are commonly employed by banks, brokerages, investment advisors, 
and mutual funds. 
                                                                                                                            
 16. See Jill E. Fisch & Hillary Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regulation 
of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1040–43 (2003) (describing the role of the analyst). 
 17. Regulation Analyst Certification, 17 C.F.R. § 242.500 (2005). 
 18. Id. 
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The literature has focused particular attention on the sell-side 
analyst.19  The term “sell-side analyst” is used to describe securities analysts 
employed by the research departments of full-service investment firms such 
as broker-dealers and investment banks.20  The key point—and one that is 
essential to this Article—is that research produced by sell-side analysts is gen-
erally available to the public, although institutional investors commonly use 
sell-side research, and sell-side analysts may provide different or more timely 
information to their institutional clients.  In contrast, buy-side analysts, 
who are typically employed by a mutual fund, hedge fund, or other institu-
tional investor, produce research exclusively for the benefit of their employers.21 
Analysts offer many types of information.  They may cover small-
capitalization or newly public companies.  They may specialize in an 
industry or sector.  They use a variety of financial models to assess company 
fundamentals.  They may use industry experts to evaluate new products or 
trends.  Ultimately, the analyst acts as an information intermediary, 
acquiring and analyzing information and then transmitting that informa-
tion to the marketplace. 
The information provided by the analyst actually consists of three 
discrete components.  First and foremost, an analyst provides coverage.  
Although this component of the analyst’s product is often overlooked, 
simply by covering a stock, an analyst dramatically increases its visibility 
to the investing public.  For small- and mid-cap companies, analyst 
coverage can make a significant difference in both liquidity and price.  For 
larger companies, the level of analyst coverage conveys important 
information about the efficiency of the market for that company’s stock.22  
                                                                                                                            
 19. See IOSCO TECHNICAL COMM., STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING SELL-
SIDE SECURITIES ANALYST CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 1 (2003), http://www.iosco.org/ 
pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD150.pdf [hereinafter IOSCO PRINCIPLES] (identifying conflicts faced by 
sell-side analysts as posing “special problems with respect to investor protection”). 
 20. IOSCO TECHNICAL COMM., REPORT ON ANALYST CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 3 
(2003), http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD152.pdf [hereinafter IOSCO REPORT]. 
 21. Id. at 3–4.  Some analysts produce and sell information on a fee or subscription basis, 
primarily to institutional clients.  These analysts are sometimes described as independent 
analysts, see id. at 4, although the nature and scope of this category varies depending on the 
particular issue involved.  For example, regulators have generally interpreted as independent, for 
purposes of the Global Research Settlement, any analyst who is not employed by a firm that 
engages in investment banking business.  Ann Davis & Susanne Craig, Analyze This: Research Is 
Fuzzier Than Ever—‘Independent’ Label Becomes a Mantra After the Crackdown, but Conflicts Have 
Emerged, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2004, at C1. 
 22. See, e.g., Stuebler v. Xcelera.com (In re Xcelera.com Sec. Litig.), 430 F.3d 503, 511 
(1st Cir. 2005) (identifying the number of analysts covering an issuer as one factor to be 
considered in determining whether the market for the issuer’s stock was efficient (citing Cammer 
v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286–87 (D.N.J. 1989))). 
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Consequently, issuers regularly provide detailed information about analyst 
coverage to their investors.23  In addition, coverage may operate as a signal 
of issuer quality.  Analysts convey negative information to the market by 
terminating coverage of an issuer.  Traditionally, analysts whose business 
interests limited their willingness to issue sell recommendations used cover-
age decisions as an alternative mechanism for conveying negative information.24 
Second, the analyst issues a report.  An analyst combines both original 
research and publicly available information and translates that information 
into a format that is usable by investors and enables investors to compare 
companies.  The comparison process is facilitated by the use of objective 
benchmarks such as earnings forecasts and price targets.  Earnings forecasts 
are one of the most salient pieces of information contained in the report and, 
because they are objectively verifiable, are the focus of many empirical 
analyses of analyst performance. 
Comparison of companies is aided by the third category of information 
provided by the analyst: the recommendation.  Analysts generally rate each 
covered security in terms of attractiveness, using a scale consisting of three 
to five categories or ratings.  Analyst recommendations have generated 
considerable controversy, largely because they have been heavily skewed 
toward the buy or strong buy categories, with very few investments rated as 
sell.  This bias has changed slightly in light of the analyst scandals of the 
late 1990s25 and the regulatory response, which includes a requirement that 
firms provide both an explanation and a distribution of their ratings.26  As a 
result, analysts now issue more sell ratings.  Researchers found, however, 
that even before those changes, although the optimistic bias reduced the 
information content of the ratings in absolute terms, analyst ratings and 
ratings changes conveyed significant information.27 
The market for analyst research is complicated by the public good 
problem.28  An analyst can sell his or her research only if it contains information 
                                                                                                                            
 23. See, e.g., Delta, Analyst Coverage, http://www.delta.com/about_delta/investor_relations/ 
analyst_coverage/index.jsp (last visited Aug. 8, 2007) (listing names, firm affiliations, and phone numbers 
of individual analysts covering Delta); Onyx Pharmaceuticals, Analyst Coverage, http://www.onyx-
pharm.com/wt/page/analyst (last visited Aug. 8, 2007) (listing names of analysts and their firms). 
 24. See infra Part II (discussing analyst optimism). 
 25. See infra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra Part IV (citing statistics on analyst recommendations). 
 27. See infra Part II. 
 28. See Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, LAW AND ECONOMICS 40 (2d ed. 1977) (defining 
public goods as characterized by nonrivalrous consumption and nonexcludability of benefits); see 
also Choi & Fisch, supra note 13, at 279, 286 (describing the consequences of the public good 
problem for the provision of analyst research). 
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that is not already in the public domain.29  It is difficult, however, to prevent 
securities information from being leaked to investors other than those who 
have produced or purchased the information.  This causes the information’s 
value to dissipate rapidly.  Indeed, once an investor has traded, it is often in 
his or her interest to leak the information to others.30  Because others cannot 
readily be excluded from using the information, it is difficult for an analyst to 
capture the full value of his or her research by selling it.31 
Quality research is also costly.32  By definition, efficient markets rapidly 
incorporate publicly available information into market price.  Only by 
uncovering material that is not widely known or by bringing an original 
insight to existing data can analysts offer investors an informational 
advantage, but uncovering such material is difficult.  As a result, research is 
widely recognized as a cost center at Wall Street firms rather than a source 
of profits.33  One study reports that Wall Street firms spent $9.1 billion 
producing research in 2003 but were only able to receive $5.91 billion for 
selling that research.34  The costly nature of analyst research coupled with 
the inability of analysts to finance their research through independent 
market transactions has led to a variety of mechanisms for subsidizing the 
cost of that research.35 
                                                                                                                            
 29. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), “[i]t is the 
nature of this type of information [that is contained in an analyst’s reports], and indeed of the 
markets themselves, that such information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of 
the corporation’s stockholders or the public generally.”  Id. at 659. 
 30. John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure 
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 725 (1984). 
 31. Id. at 726. 
 32. See Caren Chesler, Back to the Drawing Board; Independent Research Firms Are Still 
Struggling to Find a Model That Will Put Money in the Bank, INVESTMENT DEALERS’ DIG., Mar. 27, 
2006, at 26, 29 (citing a 2004 Integrity Research Study showing that some big investment banks 
spend as much as $600 million a year to run their research departments).  But see Ann Davis,  
Increasingly, Stock Research Serves the Pros, Not ‘Little Guy’—In the Wake of Spitzer Pact, Wall 
Street and Upstarts Are Catering to Elite Few—Ordering ‘Bespoke’ Reports, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 
2004, at A1 (reporting annual research budgets ranging from approximately $150 to $300 
million).  Some commentators have argued that by reducing selective information flow from 
issuers to analysts, the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) has made the generation of 
quality research substantially more costly, particularly for small issuers.  See, e.g., Armando 
Gomes et al., SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure, Information and the Cost of Capital (Working Paper, 
July 8, 2004), available at http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/emplibrary/Gomes.pdf (empirically studying 
the effect of Regulation FD on information flow). 
 33. See Chesler, supra note 32 (stating that “[i]t’s no secret that providing research on its 
own is a money-losing proposition for the big banks”). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Karen Richardson, Why Does Tech Teem With Analysts? Despite Settlement, IPO Fees 
Still Lure, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2006, at C1 (quoting Scott Cleland, president of the research firm 
Precursor, as stating that Wall Street research “isn’t necessarily driven by where the best 
investment opportunities are . . . . It’s driven by what coverage areas they can get paid for”). 
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B. Funding Research Through Other Business 
Analyst research can be funded in several ways.  It can be sold directly 
to investors.  It can be paid for, directly or indirectly, through brokerage com-
missions.  It can be subsidized by investment banking revenues.  Or, its costs 
can be covered through proprietary trading by the analyst or his or her firm. 
A number of research firms provide neither brokerage nor investment 
banking services, and sell their research directly to investors.  These 
analysts are traditionally characterized as “independent” analysts.36  The 
customers for this research are almost exclusively large institutional inves-
tors for whom the benefits of purchasing research justify the substantial 
cost.  Because the value of research dissipates quickly as it is disseminated, 
it must be sold to a limited number of investors.  One empirical study found, 
for example, that profitable trading opportunities persisted for “roughly two 
hours following the pre-market release of analyst recommendation changes 
to clients.”37 
Alternatively, research can be bundled with trading commissions.  
Traditionally, analyst research was subsidized by brokerage commissions.38  
Brokerage firms attracted trading customers through their ability to provide 
high-quality research.  Customers paid for that research by trading through 
the broker.  Because fixed commission rates prevented brokers from 
competing on commission rates, research was one way for a firm to 
distinguish itself from its competitors.  Moreover, the inability of one 
brokerage firm to undercut another by charging reduced trading fees 
eliminated any incentive for a customer to obtain information from one 
broker and then trade through a different broker. 
The SEC’s elimination of fixed commission rates in 1975 substantially 
reduced the ability of securities firms to finance research through brokerage 
commissions.39  The low cost of Internet trading has caused commissions to 
drop still further.40  Nonetheless, securities firms continue to use brokerage 
                                                                                                                            
 36. But see infra Part IV (identifying conflicts of interest at so-called independent firms). 
 37. T. Clifton Green, The Value of Client Access to Analyst Recommendations, 41 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1, 23 (2006).  In contrast, “profit opportunities dissipate within 
seconds” following a release to the public through a medium such as a television broadcast.  
Id. at 2 (citing J.A. Busse & T.C. Green, Market Efficiency in Real Time, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 
415, 435 (2002)). 
 38. See Choi & Fisch, supra note 13, at 286–87 (describing the history of subsidizing 
research through fixed brokerage commissions). 
 39. Id. at 287. 
 40. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 32, at A1 (stating that the average commission has dropped 
from fifteen cents per share in the early 1990s to five cents per share). 
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commissions from institutional investors to subsidize their research.  The 
mechanism for doing so is known as “soft-dollar commissions.”41  Soft 
dollars enable firms to bundle the cost of research with the cost of executing 
trades.  The resulting commissions charged by the securities firm are typi-
cally far greater than the cost of the trades.42  The difference between the 
trading cost for the firm and the actual commission represents payment, 
indirectly, for the research. 
The soft-dollar structure is particularly attractive to fund managers 
because, by incorporating the cost of research into commissions, the costs 
of research are paid by the fund (and its beneficiaries) rather than by the 
investment advisor.43  Soft dollars are explicitly authorized under § 28(e) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.44  Nonetheless, they have come under 
attack.45  One concern is that mutual funds have often used soft dollars 
to purchase things such as computer equipment and office supplies, that 
should be paid for by the investment advisor, not the fund.46  In addition, 
some commentators argue that fund managers should choose brokers on the 
basis of quality of execution rather than allowing execution to be bundled 
with research.47  Finally, soft dollars enable fund managers to mask their 
true cost structure because research paid for with hard dollars is included 
                                                                                                                            
 41. Soft dollars are the use of brokerage commissions to pay for research products and 
services.  Letter from Matthew P. Fink, President, Inv. Co. Inst., to William H. Donaldson, 
Chairman, SEC, Request for Rulemaking Concerning Soft Dollars and Directed Brokerage 
(Dec. 16. 2003) [hereinafter Request for Rulemaking], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
petitions/petn4-492.htm. 
 42. According to the Wall Street Journal, soft dollars can have the effect of doubling the 
commissions paid by mutual funds.  See Charles Gasparino, Mutual-Fund Investors Risk Bite 
From ‘Soft-Dollar’ Deals, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 1998, at C1 (quoting financial adviser Robert 
Levitt as stating that money managers typically pay around six cents per share for soft-
dollar commissions and three cents per share for commissions that do not include soft dollars). 
 43. NASD REPORT OF THE MUTUAL FUND TASK FORCE, SOFT DOLLARS AND PORTFOLIO 
TRANSACTION COSTS 3 (2004), http://www.nasd.com/stellent/groups/rules_regs/documents/ 
rules_regs/nasdw_012356.pdf. 
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e) (2000).  The statute was adopted, in connection with the elimina-
tion of fixed commissions, to protect mutual fund managers who paid more than the lowest 
possible commission.  NASD REPORT OF THE MUTUAL FUND TASK FORCE, supra note 43, at 2. 
 45. See Request for Rulemaking, supra note 41 (calling for SEC rulemaking to address 
abuses in the use of soft dollars). 
 46. Id.  Indeed, the SEC found examples of institutional investors using soft dollars to 
pay for travel, entertainment, and limousine services.  SEC, Inspection Report on the Soft Dollar 
Practices of Broker-Dealers, Investment Advisers and Mutual Funds (1998), http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/studies/softdolr.htm. 
 47. MUTUAL FUND DIRECTORS FORUM, BEST PRACTICES AND PRACTICAL GUIDANCE 
FOR MUTUAL FUND DIRECTORS 17–22 (2004), http://www.mfdf.com/UserFiles/File/best_pra.pdf.  
The Forum reasoned that its “guiding principles—that brokerage commissions are an asset of a 
fund, that best execution is the most important factor and that transparency is important—weigh 
strongly in favor of abandoning soft dollar arrangements involving fund assets.”  Id. at 20–21. 
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in a fund’s expense ratio, which is disclosed separately to investors, while 
research funded with soft dollars is not, even though it has the same effect 
of reducing the fund’s return to investors.48 
Last year, in response to these concerns, Fidelity Investments announced 
its decision to stop using soft dollars to pay for research.49  Although some 
experts predicted that many other firms would follow,50 to date, other asset 
managers continue to use soft dollars.51  Additionally, although regulators 
recently considered banning soft-dollar commissions,52 they ultimately 
retreated from the ban, perhaps in response to industry pressure.53  Instead, 
in July 2006, the SEC issued interpretive guidance explicitly reaffirming the 
legality of bundling research payments and brokerage commissions.54 
It might seem that firms could also charge retail investors for research 
by charging higher brokerage commissions.  In the same way that brokers 
use soft dollars to bundle research and trading costs, full-service brokerage 
commissions bundle those costs for retail customers.  In theory, retail 
customers should be willing to pay these commissions to gain access to the 
brokerage firm’s research.  Since the elimination of fixed commissions, 
however, retail commissions are highly ineffective as a method of 
                                                                                                                            
 48. NASD REPORT OF THE MUTUAL FUND TASK FORCE, supra note 43. 
 49. Richard Beales, Fidelity Hardens Its Stance on Soft Dollars: Fund Manager Has Decided 
to Pay Lehman Brothers Separately for Research, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 24, 2005, at 20. 
 50. See, e.g., Jessica Papini, Fido/Lehman Move May Squeeze Analyst Comp, WALL ST. 
LETTER, Oct. 31, 2005, available at http://www.westlaw.com (search for citation 2005 WLNR 
19182391) (quoting Morgan Stanley analyst Chris Meyer describing the move to unbundling as 
“a strong trend because soft dollars are too dangerous”). 
 51. See Chesler, supra note 32, at 30 (describing Fidelity Investments as the only firm to 
have unbundled research payments from commissions and reporting results of a January 2006 
Integrity Research survey of asset managers finding that 85 percent “say they still pay for research 
with soft dollars”). 
 52. See, e.g., Judith Burns, Business Isn’t Bustling as SEC May Move to Curb Soft-Dollar 
Arrangements, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2004, at C15 (describing possible SEC ban); Serena Ng, 
‘Soft Dollars’ Flow to Independent Researchers—Hedge Funds Give Firms a Boost With Commissions 
Frowned on by Regulators, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2005, at C3 (describing the SEC task force 
created to examine the use of soft dollars).  The U.S. Congress also held hearings on the use of 
soft dollars and considered legislation that would have made their use illegal.  See Mutual Fund 
Reform Act of 2004, S. 2059, 108th Cong., 2d sess. § 311 (2004) (proposing ban on soft dollars). 
 53. See, e.g., Arden Dale, Wall Street Makes ‘Soft Dollar’ Pitch—Brokers, Money Managers 
Urge SEC to Tread Lightly in Overhaul of Fee Deals, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2006, at C3 (describing 
efforts by brokers and research firms to dissuade SEC from the ban).  Industry insiders warned that 
a soft-dollar ban would seriously impact independent research firms.  See, e.g., Burns, supra note 
52, at C15 (describing a 2004 survey of independent research firms by Investorside Research 
Association reporting that “70% said they would consider quitting the business if the SEC bans 
soft-dollar transactions”). 
 54. SEC, GUIDANCE REGARDING CLIENT COMMISSION PRACTICES UNDER SECTION 
28(E) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 3–4 (2006), http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/interp/2006/34-54165.pdf. 
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subsidizing research, because commission rates are subject to intense 
competition, and retail customers have no obligation to trade exclusively 
with a full-service broker.  Investors can obtain research from Merrill 
Lynch and then trade on that research through Charles Schwab or TD 
Ameritrade, effectively avoiding paying Merrill Lynch for its research.55  
Moreover, it is unclear that investors should be willing to pay brokers for 
research.  Empirical research suggests that the information value of research 
dissipates rapidly; such research is unlikely to have investment value by 
the time it finds its way into the hands of retail investors.56  Moreover, 
because retail investors are under no obligation to maintain the confi-
dentiality of the information that they receive, distribution to them is 
tantamount to distribution to the general public, which has the effect of 
reducing to zero the firm’s ability to charge for the information. 
Nonetheless, a substantial percentage of retail investors continue to 
trade through full-service brokers,57 which are increasingly offering investors 
accounts in which fees are a percentage of assets rather than commission-
based, as well as a host of nontrading financial services including banking 
and insurance.58  It is unclear whether the decision to use a full-service 
broker is based on the availability of these bundled financial services; 
whether investors benefit from more generic investment advice regarding 
issues such as diversification, life-cycle planning, taxation, or identification 
of alternative investment strategies including hedging; or whether using 
a full-service broker is simply irrational.59 
The limited ability of firms to subsidize research through transactions 
with retail investors means that research is funded largely if not exclusively 
by the firm’s institutional customers.  As a result, institutional investors are 
properly understood as the analysts’ true clients.  This perspective is 
                                                                                                                            
 55. TD Ameritrade, for example, charges a commission of $9.99 for an online equity trade.  
See TD Ameritrade, http://www.tdameritrade.com/welcome1.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2007). 
 56. See, e.g., Brad Barber et al., Can Investors Profit From the Prophets?  Security Analyst 
Recommendations and Stock Returns, 56 J. FIN. 531, 562 (2001) (demonstrating that, although in 
theory brokerage research has investment value, implementing analyst recommendations requires 
high transaction costs and that, after accounting for those costs, research is unlikely to generate 
positive abnormal returns). 
 57. See Eleanor Laise & William Mauldin, Hook the Right Broker, SMARTMONEY, 
Aug. 2005, at 2, available at http://www.edwardjones.com/cgi/getData.cgi?file=/pdf/SmartMoney_ 
Reprints_FINAL.pdf (stating that 28 percent of U.S. households use a full-service broker). 
 58. See, e.g., id. (describing the services and accounts provided by full-service brokers). 
 59. Many retail investors purchase mutual funds through full-service brokers, for example, 
despite empirical evidence demonstrating that broker-recommended funds have higher fees 
and inferior performance.  Daniel Bergstresser et al., Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Brokers in 
the Mutual Fund Industry (HBS Finance Working Paper No. 616981, Mar. 15, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=616981. 
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reflected in the differential treatment that institutional clients receive 
from analysts, relative to retail investors or the general public.60  Analysts 
systematically release information to their institutional investors prior 
to its public release.61  This both prevents dissipation of the value of the 
information and assures that by the time the information is released to 
the public, its value has already been incorporated into stock prices.  As Peter 
Lynch has observed, investors are least likely to make money by following 
recommendations on stock with large institutional ownership because 
the smart money gets there first.62  In addition, retail investors often 
receive incomplete information from analysts.  For example, analysts may 
release their recommendation but not the underlying report or financial 
analysis supporting that recommendation, which contains the majority of 
the valuable information.63 
Investment banking provides an alternative source of funding for 
analyst research.  Analyst research complements a firm’s investment 
banking business in several ways.  Research departments cultivate rela-
tionships with institutional investors to whom the firm, acting as 
underwriter, can sell new securities issues.  Underwriters compete, in part, 
based on their ability to get the deal done and their ability to maximize 
selling price for the issuer; both types of services are enhanced by a 
strong institutional client base.  Analyst participation in the underwriting 
process, in turn, provides comfort to institutional clients that the invest-
ment bank will support the offering through and beyond the underwriting 
process.  The liquidity risk associated with new issues, particularly from 
small-cap companies, is greatly reduced by the assurance of continued 
analyst coverage. 
                                                                                                                            
 60. See Green, supra note 37, at 1–3 (describing the fact that institutions pay for prior 
access to analyst recommendations and that these recommendations have investment value, 
but that the investment value has dissipated by the time the information is released to the 
general public). 
 61. See Gayle Essary, Financial Research: State of the Industry, Keynote Address at 
Institutional Investors Forum 2004 (Feb. 25, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.investrend.com/ 
Admin/Topics/Articles/Resources/688_1128883186.doc) (criticizing this practice and arguing 
that analyst upgrades and downgrades are material information that should be equally available 
to all investors). 
 62. PETER LYNCH, ONE UP ON WALL STREET (1989). 
 63. Essary, supra note 61 (describing the “long-established industry practice of announcing 
‘upgrades’ or ‘downgrades’ to the general public while making the full research report . . . available 
only to a select group of clientele”). 
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During the 1990s, investment banks increasingly drew analysts into 
the underwriting process.64  Prior to the recent regulatory reforms, invest-
ment banks commonly used analysts to vet prospective offerings, review 
and opine on investment banking deals, and help pitch the firm to 
prospective investment banking clients.65  Analysts were sent on roadshows 
to assist in marketing the securities to prospective clients,66 and were 
also sent on nondeal roadshows to maintain interest in the securities of 
existing or prospective clients.67  A handful of analysts achieved such promi-
nence that they became media celebrities, receiving huge compensation 
packages in return for generating investment banking business.68  Perhaps 
best known was Salomon Smith Barney’s (SSB) Jack Grubman, who 
became the guru of the telecommunications industry.  SSB earned more 
than $790 million in investment banking revenue from telecommunications 
companies covered by Grubman.69  In return, Grubman received $67.5 
million in compensation.70 
Finally, firms can subsidize research by using it in their proprietary 
trading and asset management activities.  Similarly, analysts can, if their 
                                                                                                                            
 64. Investment banks may also use merger and acquisition (M&A) fees to subsidize 
analyst research.  As Adam Kolasinski and S.P. Kothari explain, “in every year since 1994, 
M&A fees in the U.S. have been at least as large as equity underwriting fees and in recent years 
significantly larger.”  Adam Kolasinski & S.P. Kothari, Investment Banking and Analyst Objectivity: 
Evidence From Analysts Affiliated With M&A Advisors 7 (MIT Sloan Sch. Working Paper 
No. 4575-06, Mar. 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=499068.  Kolasinski and Kothari 
describe the incentives for analyst bias based on M&A business, id. at 35, and report findings that 
M&A affiliates and analysts bias their recommendations in ways that benefit their M&A 
clients, id. at 29–30. 
 65. SEC Complaint paras. 16–19, SEC v. Henry Blodget No. 03 CV 2947 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18115b.htm [hereinafter 
Blodget Complaint] (describing how Merrill Lynch analysts assisted in investment banking deals); 
Randall Smith & Aaron Lucchetti, Analysts’ Picks of Enron Stock Face Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
26, 2002, at C1 (explaining how analysts met “with chief executives and chief financial officers of 
companies that are preparing initial public offerings of stock, vetting the companies so their firm 
doesn’t agree to underwrite an IPO [initial public offering] they can’t recommend”). 
 66. Smith & Lucchetti, supra note 65, at C1 (explaining that analysts “routinely” attended 
pre-IPO roadshows “often helping company executives schedule ‘one-on-one’ meetings with 
institutional investors that might buy the stock”). 
 67. Blodget Complaint, supra note 65. 
 68. See, e.g., Martin Sosnoff, Analyze This, FORBES, March 6, 2000, at 188 (describing how 
Wall Street’s “celebrity analysts . . . lasso investment banking clients, then hawk the clients’ 
stocks 30 days after an initial public offering”). 
 69. SEC Complaint para. 40, SEC v. Citigroup (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18111.htm. 
 70. Id. para. 41; see also Complaint for Dep’t of Enforcement at 4, Dep’t of Enforcement v. 
Quattrone, No. CAF030007 (Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/ 
csfb/nasdquatt30603spincmp.pdf (stating that Quattrone earned compensation of more than $200 
million from July 1998 to the end of 2001). 
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employer permits, use their research to engage in profitable personal 
trading.  Trading covered securities can be profitable both because it 
enables traders to use research information before it is broadly disseminated 
and because the mere publication of a research report or recommendation 
can have an effect on stock price, creating a trading opportunity. 
An ownership interest by an analyst or his employer in covered 
securities might not seem particularly problematic—after all, the analyst is 
merely “putting his money where his mouth is.”  Indeed, investors might 
view an analyst recommendation as more credible if they know that the 
analyst is investing in accordance with his public advice.  Analysts and 
their firms, however, may profit from the market effect of their public 
recommendations rather than from the underlying research that supports 
those recommendations.71  Indeed, analysts have engaged in personal trading 
contrary to their public recommendations.72  Securities firms may trade 
ahead of an analyst’s buy recommendation, effectively front-running the 
firm’s own public statements.73  In some cases, the firm goes on to unload 
the stock ahead of the investing public.  In 2000, for example, the Wall 
Street Journal reported that it was becoming increasingly common for 
Wall Street banks to take multimillion dollar equity stakes in covered 
companies.74  Although these stakes created a possible synergy between 
the bank’s trading activities and its research arm, they also created the 
risk that banks would distort their analyses to increase their trading 
profits.  In fact, the Journal reported that the banks often sold their stakes 
at the same time that the banks’ analysts were maintaining buy or 
strong buy ratings.75 
                                                                                                                            
 71. Trading on the market effect of an investment recommendation is known as front-
running or scalping, which is prohibited by the Investment Advisers Act.  15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 
(2000); see also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (interpreting scalping 
as a fraudulent practice under the Investment Advisors Act).  Most analysts, however, are not 
covered by the Act.  Fisch & Sale, supra note 16, at 1057. 
 72. See Jessica Sommar, Red-Faced SEC Targets Two-Faced Analysts, N.Y. POST, May 24, 
2002, at 41 (reporting that an SEC investigation found widespread personal trading by analysts 
contrary to their public recommendations).  In February 2006, the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) fined Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. and analyst Brad Hintz a combined 
$550,000 for personal trading by Hintz contrary to the firm’s published recommendation.  Susanne 
Craig, Moving the Market: Brokerage House, Analyst Are Fined in Conflict Case, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 
2006, at C5. 
 73. See, e.g., IOSCO REPORT, supra note 20, at 9 (reporting on how a firm “may take 
advantage of pending research and position themselves ahead of its publication”). 
 74. Mark Maremont, Raising the Stakes: As Wall Street Seeks Pre-IPO Investments, Conflicts 
May Arise, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2000, at A1. 
 75. Id. 
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II. THE QUALITY OF ANALYST RESEARCH AND THE EFFECT 
OF THE CONFLICTS 
A. Analyst Incentives for Optimism 
Do the business interests and relationships described in Part I affect 
the quality of analyst research?  In theory, research quality should be 
controlled by market forces.  Investors should be unwilling to pay for or 
trade on the basis of poor-quality research.  Reputational constraints, 
particularly those imposed by institutional clients, should limit the ability 
of analysts to bias their research out of self-interest.  On the other hand, 
informational asymmetries may limit the effectiveness of market checks.  
Moreover, investors, particularly unsophisticated retail investors, may not 
respond rationally to analyst reports and recommendations.76 
The business relationships described above create obvious incentives 
for analyst optimism.  Brokerage firms earn commissions when their custom-
ers trade.  By definition, buy  recommendations have a larger target audience 
of potential traders—the entire investing community.  In contrast, the 
market for sell recommendations is limited to current shareholders and 
short sellers.77  As a result, an analyst who issues buy recommendations 
will generate more commission revenue for his or her employer.  The 
incentives may also affect the analyst’s choice of which securities to cover.  
Stocks with greater market capitalization, as well as growth and momentum 
stocks, are likely to have greater trading volume.78 
                                                                                                                            
 76. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Regulatory Responses to Investor Irrationality: The Case of 
the Research Analyst,  10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 57 (2006) (evaluating the extent to which 
investor reliance on analyst research may be irrational); Michael B. Mikhail et al., When Security 
Analysts Talk, Who Listens? (Working Paper, April 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=709801 (finding that sophisticated investors respond differently to analyst releases than 
unsophisticated investors). 
 77. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 16, at 1045 (explaining the effect of analyst incentives on 
recommendations).  Although the availability of short selling would appear to mitigate the 
incentive for optimism generated by brokerage commissions, a variety of impediments to short 
selling limit the ability of investor to profit from negative information.  See, e.g., Eli Ofek & 
Matthew Richardson, DotCom Mania: The Rise and Fall of Internet Stock Prices, 58 J. FIN. 1113, 
1118–20 (2003) (explaining the costs to institutional investors of shorting Internet stocks during 
the dot-com bubble); Lynn Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in 
the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 728–32 (1999) (describing regulatory 
restrictions that limit short selling).  In addition, analysts who have generated information used 
by short sellers have been subject to some high-profile instances of issuer and regulatory pressure.  
See infra notes 89–90 and accompanying text (discussing Gradient Analytics). 
 78. Empirical research supports this conclusion.  See Narasimhan Jegadeesh et al., Analyzing 
the Analysts: When Do Recommendations Add Value?, 59 J. FIN. 1083, 1083 (2004) (finding that 
analysts favor “glamour” stocks over value stocks). 
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Because the goal of investment banking is to sell securities, investment 
banking relationships create similar incentives for analyst optimism.  
Institutional clients, after all, are unlikely to purchase securities unless 
those securities receive a favorable recommendation.  The underwriters’ 
sales are boosted by a positive analyst report, as are any efforts to stabilize 
the price of the securities during the offering process.  Analysts can both 
contribute to the hype associated with a hot public offering and provide 
credible support for the underwriters’ valuation.  Notably, although it 
is obviously important that analyst coverage not be negative, the mere fact 
of coverage, particularly with the promise of continued coverage, heightens 
the visibility of the securities and increases their liquidity.  This link is 
borne out by studies showing increased research coverage of industries, 
like technology, with a high number of IPOs, even when that industry’s 
performance over time is poor.79  Analyst incentives to support their employers’ 
underwriting business are, of course, increased when analyst compensation 
is tied directly to underwriting success.80 
Analysts’ relationships with their institutional customers can create 
incentives for optimism even after the IPO process is complete.  An insti-
tutional client is likely to feel betrayed if it purchases securities based on a 
favorable analyst recommendation and the analyst subsequently lowers his 
or her recommendation, leaving the client to bear the loss.  Of course, an 
analyst can privately advise institutional clients of a revision or a change in 
recommendation prior to a public announcement; but lock-up restrictions, 
liquidity constraints due to the size of an institution’s position, and the 
response of traders to institutional sales are likely to prevent the client from 
exiting fully before the stock price falls.81  Accordingly, investors themselves 
create pressure for analysts to maintain positive recommendations even 
when those recommendations may not be warranted.  Institutions, company 
officials, and sometimes the investment bank itself may also purchase 
securities in the offering pursuant to lock-up agreements, in which they 
agree not to resell the securities for a designated period of time—typically 
six months.  The promise of continued analyst support substantially reduces 
                                                                                                                            
 79. See Richardson, supra note 35, at C1 (citing report by Francois Trahan, chief invest-
ment strategist at Bear Stearns, showing that analyst coverage is “cluster[ed] around industries 
that yield the greatest volume of IPOs and brokerage fees”). 
 80. Interestingly, however, at least one study has found that analyst optimism does not 
increase the firm’s likelihood of obtaining underwriting business.  Alexander Ljungqvist et al., 
Competing for Securities Underwriting Mandates: Banking Relationships and Analyst Recommendations, 
61 J. FIN. 301 (2006). 
 81. An analyst may also jeopardize the credibility of his or her future stock picks by 
frequent downward revisions. 
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the risk associated with this holding period.  Indeed, it had been common 
for analysts to issue new positive reports, or “booster shots,” shortly before 
the expiration of these lock-up agreements, a practice that facilitated the 
sale of the securities once the lock-up expired.82 
Business concerns can affect analyst incentives in other ways.  Prior 
to the SEC’s adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD), it was widely 
believed that analysts traded favorable coverage of an issuer for superior 
access to information.  Analysts expressed concern that issuers would 
respond to reports of negative information by failing to invite them to 
analyst conferences, refusing to respond to telephone inquiries, and so 
forth.  Although Regulation FD attempted to respond to this concern 
by prohibiting selective disclosure by corporate officials, the media contin-
ues to describe instances of issuer retaliation for unfavorable coverage. 
One well-known example was the suit by LVMH Moët Hennessy 
Louis Vuitton S.A. against Morgan Stanley in France.83  Morgan analyst 
Claire Kent had published negative information about LVMH.84  LVMH 
argued that Kent’s research was motivated by a desire to curry favor 
with Morgan’s investment banking client Gucci Group, an archrival of 
LVMH.  A French court found that Kent had defamed LVMH and fined 
Morgan €30 million.85  Incidentally, Institutional Investor had ranked Kent 
as the number one analyst in her sector nine years in a row.86 
Despite regulatory reforms, the media reports that punitive actions 
continue against analysts who produce unfavorable research.87  For 
example, Biotech analyst Matt Murray claims that he was fired in March 
2006 by Rodman & Renshaw because of his efforts to downgrade the 
                                                                                                                            
 82. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 16, at 1050–51 (describing “booster shots”). 
 83. See CFAI-NIRI Guidelines Not Nearly Tough Enough, Comments Independent Research 
Provider, FINANCIALWIRE, May 24, 2004, http://financialwire.net/articles/article.asp?analystId=0&id= 
8823&topicId=160&level=160 (describing the LVMH suit as one of “a spate of lawsuits and threats, 
mostly in France . . . designed to squelch professional criticism”). 
 84. John Carreyrou, Stock Analyst Ruled Too Critical, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2004, at C1. 
 85. Rodney Dalton, Analyst Thumped by French Handbag, AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 26, 2004, at 28. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See, e.g., Matthew McClearn, Legal Weapon, CAN. BUS., Feb. 16, 2004, at 23 (quoting 
Jonathan Boersma, vice president of professional standards of the Association for Investment 
Management and Research, as stating that some firms are “either suing or threatening to sue 
analysts for negative coverage”); Stockgate: Greenberg Suggests Hambrecht Analyst Forced Out Over 
Overstock Downgrades, FINANCIALWIRE, Jan. 23, 2006, available at http://www.investrend.com/ 
articles/article.asp?analystId=0&id=22279&topicId=160&level=160 (reporting allegations that 
analysts were fired for producing negative research about Overstock.com). 
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stock of an investment banking client.88  Recently, two issuers, Biovail 
and Overstock.com, sued research firm Gradient Analytics, claiming 
that Gradient conspired with hedge funds to produce false negative 
research so that the hedge funds could engage in profitable short selling.89  
The issuer accusations also led the SEC to initiate investigations 
against Gradient for market manipulation and illegal short selling.90  
Even if Gradient successfully defends itself, the litigation will cause the 
research firm to incur significant legal costs. 
B. Empirical Analyses of Research Quality 
Do analysts respond to these incentives?  Extensive empirical research 
has been directed to the question of whether analyst research is tainted by 
analysts’ business interests.  As a threshold matter, the studies are ham-
pered by limitations on available data.91  Independent research firms need 
not and often do not disclose their recommendations publicly.92  Similarly, 
limited disclosure of proprietary trading and other business relationships 
impedes the ability of researchers to test the effect of conflicts of interest.93  
In any event, the results of the empirical studies are unclear.  Although 
the studies find that analyst recommendations are optimistic, it is less clear 
that this optimism misleads investors or detracts from the informativeness 
                                                                                                                            
 88. See, e.g., Robby Boyd, AG, SEC Looking Into Analyst’s Firing, N.Y. POST, Oct. 4, 2006, 
available at http://www.nypost.com/seven/10042006/business/ag__sec_looking_into_analysts_ 
firing_business_roddy_boyd.htm (describing ongoing investigations into allegations). 
 89. See Brooke A. Masters, 2 Firms Claim Conspiracy in Analyst Reports; Short-Sellers and 
Researchers Colluded, the Companies Say, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2006, at D1 (describing 
allegations in the lawsuits and pending SEC investigation). 
 90. See, e.g., Kara Scannell, SEC Subpoenas Research Firm, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2006, at 
C3 (describing the SEC investigation). 
 91. Many studies use the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database 
maintained by Thomson Financial, which contains a substantial amount of data, but relies 
on information voluntarily submitted by analysts.  Researchers recently claimed that data 
in I/B/E/S had been manipulated and that names of poorly performing analysts had been removed.  
See Christopher Brown-Humes, 20,000 Analyst Names ‘Missing,’ FIN. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006. 
 92. See, e.g., Alistair Barr, Signs of Success Scarce for Global Research Settlement, INVESTOR’S 
BUS. DAILY, Oct. 24, 2005, available at http://www.investors.com/breakingnews.asp? 
journalid=32406560&brk=1 (quoting Investars Chief Executive Kei Kianpoor as stating that 
“[b]ecause all independent firms . . . aren’t forced to make [their stock ratings] public, any 
analysis and ranking of their stock-picking performance is compromised”).  As a result, 
independent recommendations and forecasts often constitute a small percentage of the data 
in empirical studies.  See, e.g., Amanda Cowen et al., Which Types of Analyst Firms Are More 
Optimistic?, 41 J. ACCT. & ECON. 119, 121 (2006) (explaining that less than 0.5 percent of the 
forecasts studied were provided by independent analysts). 
 93. The SEC Analyst Website (SECAW), the disclosure mechanism advocated by this 
Article, would directly address these information limitations. 
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of the analysts’ research.  More importantly, the studies fail to make the 
case that investment banking conflicts result in lower-quality research. 
Studies clearly demonstrate that analyst research is optimistic in the 
sense that buy recommendations greatly outnumber sell recommendations.94  
The SEC reported survey results from 2000 showing that less than 1 percent 
of all analyst recommendations were sell recommendations.95  A study by 
Brad Barber and others found that analyst buy recommendations rose 
to a peak of 74 percent of all recommendations in 2000, while sell 
recommendations declined to 2 percent.96  Although studies have found 
a decline in optimism following the stock market crash, the Global 
Research Settlement, and increased analyst regulation, the numbers remain 
skewed toward buy recommendations.97  Analyst optimism extends 
beyond recommendations and also affects earnings forecasts and price 
targets.  Mark Bradshaw, Scott Richardson, and Richard Sloan, for 
example, have demonstrated optimism in both earnings forecasts and target 
prices.98  Anup Agrawal and Mark Chen found bias in analysts’ long-term 
earnings forecasts (but not in short-term forecasts).99 
Despite its optimism, analyst information clearly has information 
value.  The release of analyst information is surprisingly effective in moving 
prices.100  A recent study by Paul Ryan and Richard Taffler, for example, 
                                                                                                                            
 94. See Fisch, supra note 76, at 64–65 (describing studies finding excessive analyst 
optimism).  Importantly, the studies do not incorporate noncoverage as a mechanism for convey-
ing negative information. 
 95. Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant, SEC, Speech at the Third Annual SEC 
Disclosure & Accounting Conference: The State of Financial Reporting Today: An Unfinished 
Chapter III (June 21, 2001) (transcript available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/spch508.htm) 
(reporting that only 0.8 percent of 26,000 analyst recommendations surveyed as of March 1, 2000, 
were sell or strong sell). 
 96. Brad M. Barber et al., Buys, Holds, and Sells: The Distribution of Investment Banks’ Stock 
Ratings and the Implications for the Profitability of Analysts’ Recommendations 3 (Working Paper, 
Sept. 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=495882. 
 97. See, e.g., id. (reporting that buy recommendations numbered 42 percent at the end of 
June 2003, while sell recommendations had increased to 17 percent); see also Ohad Kadan et al., 
Conflicts of Interest and Stock Recommendations—The Effects of the Global Settlement and Recent 
Regulations 15–16 (AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper, May 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=568884 (finding that analyst optimism decreased following the adoption of various 
regulatory reforms). 
 98. Mark T. Bradshaw et al., Pump and Dump: An Empirical Analysis of the Relation 
Between Corporate Financing Activities and Sell-Side Analyst Research (Working Paper, May 
2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=410521. 
 99. Anup Agrawal & Mark A. Chen, Analyst Conflicts and Research Quality 25 (Robert 
H. Smith Sch. Research Paper No. RHS 06-042, August 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=559412. 
 100. See, e.g., id. at 3 (citing studies demonstrating the investment value of analyst 
forecasts and recommendations); Scott E. Stickel, The Anatomy of the Performance of Buy and Sell 
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revealed that sell-side analyst recommendations and earnings forecast 
revisions explain “17.4% of major market-adjusted price changes and 16.1% 
of high trading volumes that are triggered by reported news events.”101  
Analyst releases of reports or revisions commonly trigger significant stock 
price reactions.102  Jeffrey Busse and T. Clifton Green demonstrated, for 
example, that the market responds in seconds to analyst information aired 
on CNBC and that the price response persists for weeks after the show.103 
The price effect of analyst information is particularly significant in light 
of the substantial institutional ownership of the market.  Institutions, to a 
large extent, move prices.104  Moreover, analyst coverage focuses primarily 
on those issuers with substantial institutional ownership.  Institutional 
investors, unlike individual retail investors, should be aware of analyst’s 
potential conflicts and not be fooled by tainted research or misled by 
overoptimism.  Institutional investors can and do use their own buy-side 
analysts, who are free of the potential taint of the above-described business 
relationships.  Institutions also have the resources to purchase research 
directly from analysts in market transactions that do not pose the risk of a 
conflict.  Yet, institutions use and rely on information from supposedly 
conflicted analysts rather than relying exclusively on unaffiliated analysts.105  
The only plausible reason for their continued use of sell-side research is 
that, despite the potential conflicts, analysts provide useful information.106 
                                                                                                                            
Recommendations, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.–Oct. 1995, at 25, 25 (concluding that buy and 
sell recommendations influence stock prices); Kent L. Womack, Do Brokerage Analysts’ 
Recommendations Have Investment Value?, 51 J. FIN. 137, 164 (1996) (finding “strong evidence 
that stock prices are significantly influenced by analysts’ recommendation changes”). 
 101. Paul Ryan & Richard J. Taffler, Are Economically Significant Stock Returns and Trading 
Volumes Driven by Firm-Specific News Releases?, 31 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 49, 51 (2004). 
 102. See, e.g., Peter Cohen, Apple Stock Jumps Following Analyst Report, MACWORLD, Nov. 
22, 2004, available at http://www.macworld.com/news/2004/11/22/applestock/index.php (reporting 
that Apple Computer stock reached a four-year high after the release of an analyst report). 
 103. Jeffrey A. Busse & T. Clifton Green, Market Efficiency in Real Time, 65 J. FIN. 
ECON. 415 (2002). 
 104. See Scott Gibson & Assem Safieddine, Does Smart Money Move Markets?, 29 J. 
PORTFOLIO MGMT. 66 (2003) (finding that the magnitude of the price response to earnings 
announcements is related to the extent and nature of institutional ownership). 
 105. See, e.g., Green, supra note 37, at 1 (“Institutional investors pay significant amounts 
to obtain real-time access to brokerage firm research through providers such as First Call . . . .”); 
id. at 3 (“Trading activity more than doubles following recommendation changes . . . .”); Paul 
J. Irvine, Analysts’ Forecasts and Brokerage-Firm Trading, 79 ACCT. REV. 125, 126, 147–48 
(2004) (finding that clients of brokerage firms, including institutional investors, increase trading 
in response to recommendations and forecast revisions of brokerage firm analysts). 
 106. See Yingmei Cheng et al., Buy-Side Analysts, Sell-Side Analysts, and Investment Decisions 
of Money Managers (Working Paper, Mar. 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=383060 
(modeling the manner in which fund managers use sell-side research and empirically testing 
the factors that influence reliance on sell-side analysts). 
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Regulators have attributed analyst optimism to investment banking 
conflicts of interest.  A substantial number of recent studies have 
attempted to test this conclusion, and the results remain mixed.  In 
part, the conflicting results may be due to differences between analyst 
recommendations and other information such as earnings forecasts.  A 
number of studies have found that analysts who are affiliated with 
investment banking firms issue more optimistic recommendations than 
nonaffiliated analysts,107 and that analysts make more optimistic recom-
mendations with respect to issuers that have underwriting relationships 
with their firms.108  A recent paper by Barber and others found a concen-
tration of excessive optimism by affiliated analysts during the bear 
market immediately following the NASDAQ market peak.  The authors 
posited that this optimism was due to a reluctance to downgrade stocks 
whose prospects dimmed during the bear market.109  Similarly, Adam 
Kolasinski and S.P. Kothari found “evidence that M&A related conflicts 
significantly influence[d] analyst recommendations” during the 1993–2001 
time period.110 
Other studies have failed to find a strong tie between investment 
banking relationships and forecast accuracy.111  Agrawal and Chen found 
                                                                                                                            
 107. See, e.g., Amitabh Dugar & Siva Nathan, The Effect of Investment Banking Relationships 
on Financial Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts and Investment Recommendations, 12 CONTEMP. ACCT. 
RES. 131 (1995) (finding the earnings forecasts and stock recommendations issued by analysts 
affiliated with investment banks are more optimistic than those by unaffiliated analysts); 
Hsiou-wei Lin & Maureen F. McNichols, Underwriting Relationships, Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts 
and Investment Recommendations, 25 J. ACCT. & ECON. 101 (1998) (showing that affiliated 
analysts issued significantly more favorable growth forecasts and recommendations); Anup 
Agrawal & Mark A. Chen, Do Analyst Conflicts Matter? Evidence From Stock Recommendations 33 
(Working Paper No. RHS-06-038, July 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=654281 
(finding that “analysts respond to investment banking and brokerage conflicts by inflating their 
stock recommendations”). 
 108. See, e.g., Roni Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of 
Underwriter Analyst Recommendations, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 653, 657 (1999) (finding that lead 
underwriter analysts make 50 percent more buy recommendations than unaffiliated analysts). 
 109. Brad M. Barber et al., Comparing the Stock Recommendation Performance of 
Investment Banks and Independent Research Firms 3–4 (Working Paper, Sept. 2005), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=572301.  Significantly, however, the study found no significant bias 
by affiliated analysts in the pre-2000 bull market.  Id. at 3. 
 110. Kolasinski &  Kothari, supra note 64, at 2.  But see Jonathan Clarke et al., Are Analyst 
Recommendations Biased? Evidence From Corporate Bankruptcies, 41 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 169 (2006) (finding that analyst recommendations for firms filing for bankruptcy 
during the 1995–2001 time period were not overly optimistic and that affiliated analysts were 
not influenced by conflicts of interest). 
 111. At least one study has found that brokerage-affiliated analysts were even more 
optimistic than analysts affiliated with investment banks.  See Jeffery Abarbanell & Reuven 
Lehavy, Biased Forecasts or Biased Earnings?  The Role of Reported Earnings in Explaining Apparent 
Bias and Over/Underreaction in Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts 7–8 (Working Paper, Jan. 2003), 
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that neither brokerage nor investment banking conflicts affected the 
quality of short-term earnings forecasts, after controlling for forecast age, 
firm resources, and analyst workloads.112  They did find that long-term 
forecasts produced by brokerage-affiliated analysts were optimistically 
biased.113  Amitabh Dugar and Siva Nathan found earnings forecasts by 
investment-banking analysts and non-investment-banking analysts to be 
equally accurate.114  Amanda Cowen and others found that price and 
earnings forecasts by underwriter analysts were less biased than those made 
by analysts at brokerage-only firms.115  Jonathan Clarke and others found 
“large investment banks issue less optimistic and more accurate earnings 
forecasts, while making more favorable stock recommendations [than 
independent analysts].”116  As this study demonstrates, although optimism is 
related to forecast accuracy, it is not the same thing.117  John Jacob, Steve 
Rock, and David Weber also found that “forecasts from analysts employed 
by [investment banks] are generally more accurate than forecasts from 
analysts employed by independent research firms.”118 
On the whole, analyst-recommended stocks outperform the market,119 
and this performance persists120 and is not a short-term reaction to the 
                                                                                                                            
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=232453 (finding that the distribution of negative forecast 
errors by analysts is inconsistent with hypotheses of analyst optimism based on investment-
banking conflicts and other incentives). 
 112. Agrawal & Chen, supra note 107, at 5. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Dugar & Nathan, supra note 107, at 152. 
 115. Cowen et al., supra note 92. 
 116. Jonathan Clarke et al., The Good, the Bad and the Ugly? Differences in Analyst Behavior 
at Investment Banks, Brokerages and Independent Research Firms 4 (Working Paper, Sept. 2004), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=562181. 
 117. But see Roger K. Loh & G. Mujtaba Mian, Do Accurate Earnings Forecasts Facilitate 
Superior Investment Recommendations?, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 455 (2006) (demonstrating a correlation 
between forecast accuracy and the investment value of an analyst’s recommendations). 
 118. John Jacob et al., Do Analysts at Independent Research Firms Make Better Earnings 
Forecasts? 5 (Working Paper, July 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=434702. 
 119. See, e.g., Brad Barber et al., Can Investors Profit From the Prophets? Security Analyst 
Recommendations and Stock Returns, 56 J. FIN. 531, 561 (2001) (finding that purchasing stocks with 
the most favorable consensus recommendations produces higher returns absent transaction costs). 
 120. Some studies have found underperformance for discrete time periods.  For example, 
Roni Michaely and Kent Womack’s widely cited study finds that affiliated analyst 
recommendations led to lower returns than those of unaffiliated analysts for the 1990–1991 
time period.  Michaely & Womack, supra note 108; see Maureen F. McNichols et al., The 
Performance of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations 19 (Working Paper, Aug. 2004), available at 
http://home.business.utah.edu/actmp/wconf05/micnicholsobrienpanalsysts.doc (suggesting that 
Michaely and Womack’s findings may be specific to the time period of their sample).  
Similarly, Brad Barber and others found that analyst-recommended stocks underperformed 
less-favored stocks during the 2000–2001 time period.  Brad Barber et al., Reassessing the 
Returns to Analysts’ Stock Recommendations, FIN. ANALYSTS’ J., Mar.–Apr. 2003, at 18. 
64 55 UCLA LAW REVIEW 39 (2007) 
 
 
recommendation itself.121  Maureen McNichols and others studied buy 
recommendations following an IPO and found that buy recommendations 
from affiliated analysts “generally earned significantly higher returns” 
than those from unaffiliated analysts.122  Significantly, the study was 
conducted during the 1994–2001 time period, a period in which affiliated 
analysts were alleged to have engaged in the most egregious misconduct.123  
Leslie Boni and Kent Womack found that analysts are particularly effective 
at picking and ranking stocks within their industry of expertise, suggesting 
that industry-specific knowledge is a component of the value provided by 
analyst research.124 
There are several reasons why analysts affiliated with investment 
banks might produce more accurate information.  One possible explanation 
is the presence of natural synergies between investment banking and 
research.125  For example, investment-banking analysts may have access 
to superior information or a better understanding of the industry by virtue 
of their firm’s investment banking operations.126  A currently pending 
securities fraud case against Credit Suisse, for example, is premised on 
the claim that Credit Suisse analysts, by virtue of their involvement in 
the firm’s investment banking operations, obtained negative infor-
mation about America Online (AOL) that they failed to disclose in 
                                                                                                                            
 121. See Womack, supra note 100. 
 122. McNichols et al., supra note 120, at 18. 
 123. Id. at 19. 
 124. Leslie Boni & Kent L. Womack, Analysts, Industries, and Price Momentum, 41 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 85, 106 (2006); see also Chul W. Park & Morton Pincus, Market 
Reactions to Changes in Analyst Consensus Recommendations Following Quarterly Earnings 
Announcements 1 (Working Paper, Oct. 2000), available at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/accounting/ 
papers/workingpapers/00-10.pdf (finding that analyst consensus revisions have information 
content and concluding that this “finding is consistent with the capital market viewing consen-
sus analyst recommendation revisions as reflecting valuable expertise to process and interpret 
public signals”). 
 125. Cf. Steven Drucker & Manju Puri, On the Benefits of Concurrent Lending and 
Underwriting, 60 J. FIN. 2763 (2005) (identifying synergies when a financial institution provides 
both loans and underwriting services to an issuer and concluding that such synergies benefit the 
issuer through lower underwriter fees and loan costs). 
 126. See Murali Jagannathan & Srinivasan Krishnamurthy, Investment Banker Directors and 
Affiliated Analysts’ Forecasts, 3 J. INV. MGMT. 4, 19 (2005) (finding that firms with investment 
banker directors issue more accurate forecasts and attributing that accuracy to better access to 
firm-specific information); Erik Sirri, Investment Banks, Scope, and Unavoidable Conflicts of Interest, 
(Working Paper, 2004), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/news/CONFEREN/fm2004/sirri.pdf 
(describing potential synergies and economies of scale that can result from integrating 
investment banking, securities sales, and proprietary trading within a single financial firm); 
see also Dugar & Nathan, supra note 107, at 152. 
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their research reports.127  But for the firm’s investment banking operations, 
the analysts would not have had access to this information. 
Alternatively, differences in pay structures and resources may enable 
investment banks to attract better analysts.128  The high compensation paid 
to analysts because of their role in investment banking during the late 
1990s, the time period that is the subject of many of these studies, may 
have allowed investment banks to attract highly skilled analysts.129  A third 
possibility is that, although the conflicts have the potential to distort 
analyst reports, analysts do not respond to this incentive.  Perhaps the 
incentive is outweighed by the analyst’s need to maintain a sufficient 
reputation for accuracy to be able to convey information credibly to the 
market.  Mark Chen and Robert Marquez, for example, model the relation-
ship between investment banking conflicts and research quality.  As they 
have demonstrated, the desire to attract future underwriting business 
may create an incentive for optimism, but unbiased research may lead to 
more accurate pricing or a better stock of underwriting customers.130  
The benefits to the firm of accurate research may act as a check on an 
analyst’s natural tendency toward optimism because too much optimism 
will result in the analyst losing his or her credibility and thus the ability 
to help sell securities.131 
Studies have found that analyst reputation matters, suggesting that 
the market disciplines analysts for tainted research.  Lily Fang and 
Ayako Yasuda found that recommendations by analysts with strong 
reputations have the greatest market effect.132  Similarly, Sorin Sorescu 
and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam observed that “there is reliable evidence 
that both experience and reputation count in the analyst industry.”133  
                                                                                                                            
 127. In re Credit Suisse-AOL Sec. Litig., 465 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D. Mass. 2006). 
 128. See Jacob et al., supra note 118, at 5 (suggesting that their findings are consistent with 
higher skill levels and resources at investment banks). 
 129. See Nina Mehta, Sellside Research Must Try Harder: Rocked by Scandals, Institutional 
Sellside Research Will Never Be the Same, TRADERS MAG., Dec. 1, 2003, at 32, 38 (describing analyst 
compensation as dropping by 30 percent during 2003, as firms began to implement regulatory reforms). 
 130. Mark A. Chen & Robert Marquez, Regulating Securities Analysts (Working Paper, Mar. 
2004) (copy on file with the UCLA Law Review). 
 131. This perhaps explains Alexander Ljungqvist and other’s finding that analyst optimism 
does not enable investment banks to attract underwriting business.  See Ljungqvist et al., supra 
note 80 (finding no evidence that aggressive analyst recommendations or upgrades increased their 
employer’s ability to win an underwriting contract). 
 132. Lily H. Fang & Ayako Yasuda, Are Stars’ Opinions Worth More? The Relation Between 
Analyst Reputation and Recommendation Values (AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper, Dec. 2005), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=687491. 
 133. Sorin Sorescu & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, The Cross-Section of Analyst Recommendations, 
41 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 139, 141 (2006). 
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Additionally, the market appears to respond to investment banking and 
other conflicts by discounting information that carries the greatest risk of 
bias.  For example, studies have shown a limited market response to buy 
recommendations issued by investment bank–affiliated analysts, a more 
significant response to recommendation revisions, and a greater response 
to downgrades than to upgrades.134 
The empirical results are troubling, because they highlight a key 
concern about mandated analyst independence.  If analyst research 
provides useful information to the market and if affiliated analysts produce 
more accurate research, either because of synergistic effects or higher 
pay scales, then the forced separation of investment banking from research 
may reduce not just research quantity, but also research quality.  Moreover, 
if the top sell-side analysts cannot receive multimillion dollar compensation 
packages based on their firm’s investment banking revenues, they are likely 
to seek alternative positions in which they can receive comparable 
compensation positions that may reduce public and market access to the 
information they produce.135 
III. REGULATORY RESPONSE TO ANALYST CONFLICTS 
U.S. regulators responded to the analyst scandals136 with a variety of 
new rules.137  The new regulations include disclosure requirements, 
                                                                                                                            
 134. See Carl R. Chen et al., Are All Security Analysts Equal?, 25 J. FIN. RES. 415, 426 (2002) 
(finding that national brokerage firm analysts have the greatest ability to affect stock prices, 
but that buy recommendations from such analysts do not have a significant effect on firm 
valuation); Dugar & Nathan, supra note 107, at 150 (showing that market participants seem to 
discount optimism in investment banker analysts’ research more heavily, but the difference is 
not statistically significant); Michael J. Ho & Robert S. Harris, Market Reactions to Messages From 
Brokerage Rating Systems, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.–Feb. 1998, at 49 (finding that stock prices react 
more significantly to ratings downgrades than to upgrades). 
 135. Hedge funds, for example, are reportedly bringing some former sell-side analysts 
in-house.  Identifying short-selling opportunities for hedge funds can be lucrative; top analysts are 
reportedly commanding compensation packages of $1 to $4 million.  Ann Davis, Negative Analysts 
Score Points, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2004, at C5. 
 136. For a further description of the analyst scandals, see Jill E. Fisch, Fiduciary Duties and 
the Analyst Scandals, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1083, 1083–84 (2007). 
 137. Evaluating the rationale for and effect of the U.S. regulatory reforms is important 
from a global perspective because a number of countries are examining potential analyst 
conflicts of interest and considering the extent to which they should follow the U.S. regulatory 
approach.  See, e.g., AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N, MANAGING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: AN 
ASIC GUIDE FOR RESEARCH REPORT PROVIDERS 4 (2004), http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/ 
lkuppdf/ASIC+PDFW?opendocument&key=managing_conflicts_interest_guide_pdf; AUSTL. SEC. 
& INV. COMM’N, RESEARCH ANALYST INDEPENDENCE 8 (2003), http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/ 
pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/Analyst_Independence_Report.pdf/$file/Analyst_Independence_ 
Report.pdf; FOREIGN GROUP TO THE EUROPEAN COMM’N, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS: BEST 
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limitations on personal trading by analysts, and a variety of structural 
reforms.  The reforms characterize analyst business relationships as conflicts 
of interest138 and attempt to reduce or eliminate these conflicts through 
mandated independence.  The primary focus is on investment banking 
conflicts of interest.139  The regulations require that firms formally separate 
research from investment banking and attempt to eliminate the potential 
influence of a firm’s investment banking operations on analyst behavior.  
Significantly, the reforms do not address the relationship between research 
and brokerage, nor do they require that analyst compensation be independ-
ent of a firm’s trading commissions. 
Of the reforms, the Global Research Settlement between the New 
York attorney general, the SEC, and ten large Wall Street banks received 
the most public attention and imposes the most extensive restrictions.140  
The terms of the settlement mandated a formal separation of investment 
banking and research for firms subject to the settlement.141  The settlement 
                                                                                                                            
PRACTICES IN AN INTEGRATED EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MARKET (2003), http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/internal_market/securities/docs/analysts/bestpractices/report_en.pdf; IOSCO TECHNICAL 
COMM., REPORT ON ANALYST CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 2 (2003), http://www.iosco.org/library/ 
pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD152.pdf; IOSCO TECHNICAL COMM., STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 
FOR ADDRESSING SELL-SIDE SECURITIES ANALYST CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (2003), 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD150.pdf; Fin. Serv. Auth., Conflicts of Interest: 
Investment Research and Issues of Securities (Consultation Paper 171, Feb. 2003), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp171.pdf. 
 138. It is not clear that this characterization is warranted.  Cf. Jerome P. Kassirer, Financial 
Conflict of Interest: An Unresolved Ethical Frontier, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 149, 152 (2001) (defining a 
conflict of interest as “a condition in which an individual’s professional judgment is unduly 
influenced by some personal gain”). 
 139. See SEC, Statement Regarding Global Settlement Related to Analyst Conflicts 
of Interest (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042803com.htm 
(describing limitations on investing banking contacts as “designed to maintain the analyst’s role 
as gatekeeper in the offering process but to prevent the analyst from serving as marketer or 
cheerleader for investment banking transactions”). 
 140. See SEC, supra note 12 (describing settlement terms); Global Research Analyst 
Settlement Final Judgment Addendum A, supra note 12 (describing settlement requirements in 
more detail). 
 141. Importantly, the reforms described in this Part apply only to the investment banks that 
participated in the settlement.  Initially, the settlement applied to ten banks, but two additional 
banks subsequently agreed to be bound by the settlement.  See Press Release, SEC, Deutsche Bank 
Securities Inc. and Thomas Weisel Partners LLC Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of 
Interest Between Research and Investment Banking (Aug. 26, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/press/2004-120.htm.  Some states are imposing the provisions of the settlement more broadly.  
Former California treasurer Phil Angelides, for example, imposed the requirements, including the 
physical separation of investment banking and research, on all investment banks that do business 
with the State of California.  Press Release, Phil Angelides, Cal. Treasurer, Treasurer Angelides 
Announces Tough New Requirements for Investment Banks That Do Business With State of 
California (May 8, 2003), available at http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/news/releases/2003/20030508ips.pdf; 
Press Release, Off. of the N.J. Att’y Gen., New Jersey to Receive $561,458 in Wachovia Settlement 
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requires firms both to maintain Chinese Walls (information barriers) and 
a physical separation between investment banking and research.142  All 
communications between analysts and investment bankers are strictly 
limited—communications are prohibited except on specifically designated 
topics, and those communications must be made in the presence of a 
chaperone.143  Analysts are prohibited from assisting the underwriting 
process in various ways, and an analyst’s compensation may not be 
based on underwriting performance.  Firms are also required to provide 
investors with a variety of disclosures—including a “warning notice” 
that the firm’s investment banking business may affect the objectivity 
of its research, and quarterly disclosure of the firm’s earnings forecasts, 
ratings, and price targets—in order to enable investors to evaluate ana-
lyst performance.144  The settlement also required the banks to provide 
independent research to their customers for a period of five years under 
the supervision of an independent consultant.145  According to SEC 
Chairman William Donaldson, the settlement was designed “to help 
restore investor’s faith in the objectivity of research.”146 
In section 501 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,147 Congress directed 
the SEC or the SROs to promulgate rules to address analyst conflicts of 
interest more broadly.  The statute explicitly stated that its objective 
was “to protect the objectivity and independence of securities analysts.”148  
Congress’s instructions with respect to the required rulemaking were fairly 
detailed: Congress specified that the rules were to restrict prepublication 
                                                                                                                            
(Sept. 7, 2006), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases06/pr20060907a.html (describing 
efforts by North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) Analyst Research Task 
Force Steering Committee in organizing and coordinating efforts of state regulators to address 
research analyst conflicts of interest). 
 142. See SEC, supra note 12.  The physical separation requirement has resulted in firms 
constructing separate offices and even bathrooms.  As one banker only “half-jokingly” stated, “he 
was not even allowed to go into the bathroom with a research analyst without a compliance offi-
cer tagging along, although that is not quite how he phrased it.”  Landon Thomas, Jr. & Gretchen 
Morgenson, 2 Analysts Likely to Pay $20 Million in Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2003, at C1. 
 143. Indeed, the SEC only subsequently conceded that a chaperone was not required 
to supervise a phone call in which an analyst and an investment banker merely scheduled a 
future chaperoned conversation.  Letter from James A. Brigagliano, Assistant Dir. of SEC Div. of 
Mkt. Regulation, to Dana G. Fleischman, SEC Answer to Question 12 (Nov. 2, 2004), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/grs110204.htm. 
 144. William Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Address Prepared for Delivery at SEC 
Press Conference Regarding Global Settlement (Apr. 28, 2003) (transcript available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042803whd.htm). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 501, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 148. Id. § 501(a)(1). 
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clearance of research reports by investment bankers, to prevent investment 
banking personnel from supervising analysts or evaluating them for purposes 
of compensation decisions, and to prohibit retaliation for research that 
adversely affected a firm’s investment banking relationships.149  The statute 
also required rules that establish “structural and institutional safeguards” 
to separate research from investment banking within firms.150  In addition, 
Congress instructed the regulators to require a variety of disclosures, 
including information about an analyst’s personal ownership positions in 
covered securities and investment banking relationships.151  Again, the focus 
on the statute was investment banking conflicts, not brokerage or other 
business relationships.  Importantly, because the statute was structured as a 
component of the SEC’s regulatory authority over registered brokers and 
dealers, it does not extend to analysts that are not associated with a registered 
broker or dealer.  In particular, the statute does not give the SEC the 
authority to regulate pure research firms or their analysts. 
The SEC delegated responsibility for compliance with section 501 
to two SROs: the NYSE and the NASD.152  The NYSE and the NASD 
adopted two sets of rule changes to address analyst conflicts, one while 
Congress was in the process of considering the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
the second subsequent to the adoption of the statute.153  Briefly, the 
                                                                                                                            
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. § 501(a)(3). 
 151. Id. § 501(b). 
 152. See Implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 43 (2003) (statement of William H. Donaldson, 
Chairman, SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/090903tswhd.htm (describing the 
SEC’s approval of the self-regulatory organizations (SRO) rules and explaining that “[t]he 
Commission worked closely with the SROs to conform their rules to meet the directives of the Act”). 
 153. See Self-Regulating Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the 
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and 
Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 2 to the Proposed 
Rule Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and Amendment No. 1 to the 
Proposed Rule Change by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Research Analyst 
Conflicts of Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-45908, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,968 (May 10, 2002), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-45908.htm [hereinafter First SRO Analyst Release]; Self-
Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the New York Stock 
Exchange to Rules 344 (“Supervisory Analysts”), 345A (“Continuing Education for Registered 
Persons), 351 (“Reporting Requirements”) and 472 (“Communications with the Public”) and by the 
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest 
and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 3 to 
the Proposed Rule Change by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and Amendment No. 3 to the 
Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to 
Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48252, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,875 
(July 29, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48252.htm [hereinafter Second SRO 
Analyst Release]. 
70 55 UCLA LAW REVIEW 39 (2007) 
 
 
reforms, which are concentrated in NASD Rule 2711154 and NYSE Rules 
472155 and 351,156 incorporate three approaches: structural safeguards, 
prohibitions on problematic practices, and increased disclosure require-
ments.  With respect to structural safeguards, the reforms parallel the 
guidance reflected in the statute.  They include a prohibition on investment 
banking personnel supervising analysts or approving their reports, a ban 
on retaliation for research reports that adversely affect the firm’s invest-
ment banking business, and the establishment of quiet periods during which 
investment banks participating in an offering are prohibiting from releasing 
research reports.157  The rules also detail formal procedures to insulate 
analyst compensation from investment banking influence, including the 
requirement that banks use compensation committees to determine analyst 
compensation, which must be based on performance and research quality, 
not on investment banking business.158  Prohibited practices include the 
issuance of booster shots and the participation by analysts in solicitations of 
investment banking business, as well as the receipt by analysts of pre-IPO 
securities and personal trading during blackout periods surrounding the 
release of a research report.159 
The rules also increase disclosure requirements.  Analysts are required 
to disclose any actual or potential conflicts of interest, including whether 
the subject company is a client of the analyst’s firm and any firm compen-
sation based on investment banking revenues.  In addition, the rules require 
information about the firm’s rating systems, including an explanation of 
“the meanings of all ratings used by the member or member organization 
in its ratings system,”160 “the percentage of all securities that the member or 
member organization recommends an investor ‘buy,’ ‘hold,’ or ‘sell,’”161 
and “a chart that depicts the price of the subject company’s stock over 
time and indicates points at which a member or member organization 
assigned or changed a rating or price target.”162 
                                                                                                                            
 154. NASD Rule 2711, NASD Manual (CCH) 4516-25 (Dec. 2006). 
 155. NYSE Rule 472, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2472 (Oct. 2006). 
 156. NYSE Rule 351, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2351 (Mar. 11, 2004). 
 157. See First SRO Analyst Release, supra note 153 (summarizing rule changes); Second 
SRO Analyst Release, supra note 153 (same). 
 158. See sources cited supra note 157. 
 159. See sources cited supra note 157. 
 160. NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(i)(f), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2472 (Oct. 2006). 
 161. Id. at 472(k)(1)(i)(g). 
 162. Id. at 472(k)(1)(i)(h); see also Brad Barber et al., supra note 96 (describing the distri-
bution disclosure required by NASD Rule 2711 and empirically analyzing its effect). 
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The SRO rules expand the limitations on personal trading by analysts.  
NYSE Rule 472 and NASD Rule 2210 had previously required that ana-
lysts disclose if they had a financial interest in a covered security, although 
there are indications that enforcement of the requirement was extremely 
limited.163  The new rules expand on the disclosure requirement and 
explicitly require that analysts disclose personal positions in covered 
company securities, including options and derivatives positions, both in 
their reports and in public appearances.164  In addition, the rules prohibit 
analysts from personal trading in covered securities “for the period begin-
ning 30 days prior to the issuance of the research report and ending five 
days after the date of the report.  The analyst also may not engage in 
trading contrary to the analyst’s most recent recommendations.”165 
The SEC enacted two rules addressed to analyst conflicts of interest.  
SEC Regulation FD,166 which was adopted in 2000 prior to the passage 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, attempts to reduce the analyst’s incentive to 
provide favorable coverage of an issuer in order to gain access to informa-
tion by barring issuers from providing selective disclosure.167  The SEC 
characterized the rule as an effort to reduce analyst conflicts, explaining: 
“Selective disclosure also may create conflicts of interests for securities 
analysts, who may have an incentive to avoid making negative statements 
about an issuer for fear of losing their access to selectively disclosed 
information.”168  Regulation AC,169 which was adopted in 2003, was intended 
by the SEC to complement the new regulations adopted by the SROs.170  
Regulation AC requires analysts to certify that the views expressed in their 
                                                                                                                            
 163. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 16, at 1043–44 (describing the prior disclosure requirements). 
 164. First SRO Analyst Release, supra note 153.  It is unclear exactly what this disclosure 
requirement means.  As the SEC noted in its release, previously the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) had allowed the use of conditional language, such as the firm or its analysts 
“may own” covered securities.  Id.  The Release does not explicitly reject the use of such 
language, and it appears that some firms are continuing to structure their disclosures in this 
way.  In addition, firms are only required to disclose ownership positions of 1 percent of the 
issuer’s equity securities.  Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 34-43154, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm. 
 167. Id.  For a detailed discussion of Regulation FD and the history of its adoption, see 
Fisch & Sale, supra note 16. 
 168. SEC, Fact Sheet: Regulation Fair Disclosure and New Insider Trading Rules (Aug. 10, 
2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/seldsfct.htm. 
 169. Regulation Analyst Certification, Securities Act Release No. 33,8193, 68 Fed. Reg. 
9482 (Feb. 20, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8193.htm. 
 170. Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, SEC, Statement at SEC Open Meeting: Proposal of 
Regulation AC (July 24, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
spch578.htm). 
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reports reflect their personal views and to disclose any relationship between 
their compensation and their recommendation.171 
IV. EFFECTS OF THE REGULATORY REFORMS 
A. Effect on Analyst Recommendations and Performance 
Although it is far too soon to measure the effect of the new regulations, 
early reports are mixed.  The evidence indicates that analyst recommen-
dations, although still optimistic, have become more balanced.  For 
example, research by Ohad Kadan and others found that affiliated 
analysts recommendations are now no more optimistic than those of 
unaffiliated analysts.172  Troublingly, however, they found that recommen-
dations are now less informative.173  Barber and others found a substantial 
decline in the percentage of buy recommendations issued by invest-
ment bank–affiliated analysts after 2000 and an overall increase in 
analyst use of negative or neutral recommendations.174  In part, however, 
the change appears to reflect a shift in rating systems—in particular, the 
move by a number of firms from a five-category to a three-category 
rating scale.175  In addition, the percentage of negative or sell 
recommendations has remained low176 and is again shrinking.  StarMine 
Investors reported that only 7.1 percent of analyst recommendations were 
sells in 2006, down from a peak of 10.4 percent in 2003.177 
With respect to performance, the large-scale studies still primarily 
consider data from the period prior to the implementation of the 
                                                                                                                            
 171. Regulation Analyst Certification, Securities Act Release No. 33,8193, 68 Fed. Reg. 
9482 (Feb. 20, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8193.htm. 
 172. Kadan et al., supra note 97, at 26. 
 173. Id. at 15. 
 174. Barber et al., supra note 109, at 14.  On the other hand, Leslie Boni found that the 
ten investment bank signatories to the Global Research Settlement both reduced coverage 
and increased the optimism of their recommendations.  See Janet S. Kidd, With Analyst 
‘Sell’ Signals Rare, Investors Need to Be Alert, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 10, 2006, available at 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/yourmoney/sns-yourmoney-0910analysts,0,1718220.story? 
coll=bal-business-headlines (reporting Boni’s findings). 
 175. Kadan et al., supra note 97, at 1.  As the authors explained, “eight out of the original 
ten participants in the Global Settlement adopted a new rating system in 2002, and ten of 
the next twenty biggest brokerage houses adopted a new rating system starting in 2002.”  Id. 
at 9.  In every case, the new system reflected a change from a five-point scale to a three-
point scale.  Id.  Interestingly, the authors found that the market failed to respond to these 
massive reclassifications.  Id. at 10–11. 
 176. Id. at 32 (reporting that, even postregulation, analysts are reluctant to issue 
pessimistic recommendations). 
 177. Kidd, supra note 174. 
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regulatory reforms.  A few studies have looked at the performance of the 
specific firms that were signatories to the Global Research Settlement, and 
those studies have reported mixed results.  A 2005 study by Investars.com 
reported improvement by many of the firms that were part of the settlement 
and found that the stock picks by nine of the twelve firms had outperformed 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 over a one-year period.178  Another report, 
looking at comparable data from Investars.com, found that the performance 
of five of ten settling banks improved during the 2003–2005 time period, 
but the performance of the other five declined.179  Leslie Boni found that 
after the settlement, analyst-recommended stocks outperformed the market, 
but more often than not, stocks receiving the analysts’ worst ratings 
outperformed those receiving the strongest recommendations.180 
The effect of mandated independence cannot be evaluated solely by 
studying the effect of the new rules on analyst optimism or bias.  Regula-
tors state that the goal of recent reforms is “to improve the objectivity 
of research [and to] provide investors with more useful and reliable 
information.”181  Yet, for investors, forced separation of investment 
banking and other conflicts from research may increase the cost or 
reduce research quality, particularly if the prior performance of invest-
ment banking affiliated analysts was due in part to synergies between 
investment banking and research. 
B. Increased Market Segmentation 
The market is responding to the increased cost of funding research 
with increased segmentation.  Many firms are focusing primarily or 
exclusively on providing research to institutional investors because 
institutions are willing to pay for research, directly or indirectly, and an 
institutional clientele reduces the analyst’s liability exposure.182  This has 
led to an increased number of research firms who limit the dissemination of 
their research to a few exclusive clients183 and charge a correspondingly 
                                                                                                                            
 178. See Jane J. Kim, Stock Research Gets More Reliable: Third-Party Reviews Suggest 
Improvement in Performance of Buy-Sell Recommendations, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2005, at D1 
(describing results of Investars.com study). 
 179. Barr, supra note 92. 
 180. Leslie Boni, Analyzing the Analysts After the Global Settlement (Sept. 28, 2005), 
available at http://www.tcf.or.jp/data/20050928_Leslie_Boni.ppt#9. 
 181. Second SRO Analyst Release, supra note 153. 
 182. See Schulz, supra note 8 (describing customized research created for hedge funds). 
 183. See, e.g., Chesler, supra note 32 (identifying hedge funds’ interest in research but 
describing the traditional research model as unviable because research is distributed too broadly). 
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high fee.184  Indeed, institutions are willing to pay a substantial pre-
mium for the assurance that the research that they receive is not being 
distributed broadly.185 
Research firms are also developing specialized services tailored to the 
needs of institutional investors.  Lehman Brothers, for example, has created 
“desk analysts” to sit on clients’ trading desks and provide extra research 
attention for institutional investors.186  Firms are offering institutions 
customized research, sometimes termed “bespoke research” that responds 
to the institutional clients’ needs and instructions.187  Research firms, such 
as Vista Research and Gerson Lehrman, provide contacts and access to 
sources of company and industry information, including retired executives 
and consultants.188  Institutions reportedly pay as much as $500,000 a year 
for these contacts.189 
This segmentation is a predictable result of mandated independence.  
If cross-subsidization is no longer viable, firms will only provide research to 
those customers who are willing to pay for it.  The resulting segmentation 
has the effect of aggravating the differential between retail and institutional 
investor access to information.  If, prior to the regulatory reforms, the smart 
money got the information first, now, in many cases, retail investors do 
not get the information at all.  Moreover, market segmentation reduces the 
ability of retail investors to benefit from reputational and other forms 
of market discipline imposed by sophisticated investors.190  In many cases, 
                                                                                                                            
 184. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 32 (explaining that “the most pioneering, market-moving 
research is going exclusively to big mutual funds and the private investment pools known as 
hedge funds, not to the small investor”). 
 185. See, e.g., Schulz, supra note 8 (stating that approximately twenty research firms operate 
under this model, directing their research primarily to hedge fund clients, and charging quarterly 
subscription fees of $250,000 to $350,000). 
 186. See US Analysts, FIN. TIMES, May 5, 2006, at 18 (describing “desk analysts”). 
 187. See Davis, supra note 32 (describing custom research projects with six-figure annual fees). 
 188. Chesler, supra note 32. 
 189. Id.  Some critics have questioned whether the information provided through these 
firms extends beyond legal bounds.  See, e.g., Laurie Cohen, Private Money: The New Financial 
Order; In the Know: Seeking an Edge, Big Investors Turn to Network of Informants, Mark 
Gerson Assembles Web of Moonlighting Managers; Applebee’s Bars Practice; Drawing a Line at 
‘Nonpublic,’ WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2006, at A1 (detailing Gerson Lehrman’s practices in 
obtaining and compensating consultants).  The SEC and the New York attorney general recently 
began investigating the consulting arrangements of Vista Research and Gerson Lehrman.  
Gregory Zuckerman & Peter Lattman, Research Firms’ Consultant Ties Draw Scrutiny; New York, 
SEC Examine Information Disclosures to Hedge Funds, Others, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2007, at C1. 
 190. The problem is analogous to the problem observed in the mutual fund area, where 
segmentation limits the market’s ability to discipline fees charged by funds to less sophisticated 
investors.  Donald Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: 
Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1017, 1034 (2005). 
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institutions are using research that is not provided to databases and services 
such as Thomson First Call.191 
Retail investors are also losing access to top analysts.  The regula-
tory reforms led many financial firms to reduce greatly the compensation 
paid to analysts—a natural response to the inability of analysts to partici-
pate in investment banking.192  At the same time, many firms cut their 
research budgets.  The combination of these responses led many top 
analysts to leave sell-side firms.193  Some struck out on their own, offering 
their research on an exclusive basis to institutional clients.194  Others 
moved to investment banking,195 to the buy side, or to hedge funds.196  
To the extent that buy-side research is substituting for sell-side research, 
there are additional reasons for concern.  First, the substitution is likely 
to result in duplicative research, as multiple institutions substitute their 
own internal research for reliance on a single sell-side analyst.  Second, 
empirical evidence suggests that buy-side research may be both less 
accurate and more optimistic than sell-side research.197  Accordingly, to the 
extent that institutions are reducing their reliance on sell-side analysts, that 
reduction may come at a cost. 
                                                                                                                            
 191. See, e.g., Pam Abramowitz, Sink or Swim: Demand for Independent Research Is Up, 
but Supply Is Up Even More, 40 EUROMONEY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 77 (Dec. 1, 2006) 
(describing Telsey Advisory Group’s clients as having “exclusive access” to the firm’s research 
because it is not disseminated to First Call or other public sources). 
 192. See, e.g., Mylene Mangalindan, Oracle Hires Software Analyst, WALL ST. J., May 16, 
2003, at B2 (explaining that “many veterans in equity research are facing lower salaries and an 
image tarnished by conflict-of-interest scandals”). 
 193. See, e.g., Beth Piskora, Age of Analysts Comes to Close, N.Y. POST, Feb. 8, 2003, at 20 
(describing how established analysts are leaving investment banks as a result of the regulatory reforms). 
 194. See, e.g., Abramowitz, supra note 191 (describing how many veteran analysts have left 
investment banks to “strike out on their own”). 
 195. See Emily Thornton, Wall Street’s Research Conundrum, BUS. WK., Oct. 21, 2002, at 
120 (describing why investment banks need to keep top analysts as part of their investment 
banking teams, and predicting that “most talented and experienced analysts are likely to 
metamorphose into bankers, who earn roughly twice what they do”). 
 196. See, e.g., Hulus Alpay & Gene Marbach, Sell-Side Coverage Remains as Elusive as 
Ever, O’DWYER’S PR SERVICES REP., Jan. 2007, at 14 (stating that “analysts have been leaving 
the sell-side to join the buy-side and hedge funds”); Chris Hughes, Rubinstein Jumps Ship for 
Hedge Fund, FIN. TIMES, June 22, 2006, at 22 (describing the departure of several sell-side 
analysts to hedge funds). 
 197. Boris Groysberg et al., Do Buy-Side Analysts Out-Perform the Sell-Side? 45 (Working 
Paper, Mar. 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=806264 (finding that the buy-side firm 
analysts made markedly more optimistic and less accurate earnings forecasts than their sell-
side counterparts, even after controlling for analyst- and firm-specific factors).  The authors 
found that sell-side recommendations were more optimistic, but that the lesser optimism of 
buy-side analysts did not translate into improved return performance.  Id.  They concluded 
that the shift toward greater use of buy-side research may not be desirable.  Id. at 34. 
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C. Effect on Quantity of Information 
Retail investors are simply receiving less information.  The number of 
sell-side analysts employed by investment banks has declined drastically in 
response to the regulatory reforms.198  Those analysts who remain are 
focusing on large-cap companies, leaving many small-cap companies 
without any research coverage.199  In its 2006 report to the SEC, the 
Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies reported that 
“approximately 1,200 of 3,200 of NASDAQ-listed companies, and 35% of 
all public companies, receive no analyst coverage at all.”200  For companies 
with market capitalizations of less than $125 million, the number with no 
analyst coverage increases to 83 percent.201  Reuters found that since 2002 
alone, 691 companies lost coverage altogether.202  In addition, the combi-
nation of the independence mandate plus the quiet period means that a 
substantial number of new IPOs, particularly of small-cap companies, are 
not receiving any research coverage.203 
The Global Research Settlement provided a substantial, albeit tempo-
rary, research subsidy designed in part to mitigate these effects by filling 
the gap in coverage with more independent research.  As a result of the 
settlement, the defendant banks are collectively required to spend $432.5 
million over a five-year period to purchase independent research for 
their customers.204  The effect of this subsidy on independent research 
                                                                                                                            
 198. See, e.g., Ken Brown, Stock Research Goes From Frothy to Frugal, WALL ST. J., May 27, 
2003, at C1 (describing research cuts by Wall Street firms); Andrew Capon, Research Less Besmirched, 
EUROMONEY, June 1, 2006, at 70 (citing National Research Exchange statistics indicating that 
the number of analysts at Wall Street firms fell by 30 percent from 2001 to 2005); Marie Leone, 
The Flight of the Sell-Side Analyst, CFO.COM, July 8, 2004, http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/ 
3015019?f=options (estimating a drop in the number of sell-side analysts at 15 to 20 percent). 
 199. Thor Valdmanis, Few Believe $1.4 Billion Deal Will Change Wall Street, USA 
TODAY, Apr. 29, 2003, at 1B, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/brokerage/ 
2003-04-29-settle-cover_x.htm (quoting Zacks Investment Research as reporting a 23 percent 
increase since 2000 in the number of issuers with no coverage); Spelman Research, Independent 
Investment Research, http://www.spelmanresearch.com/learn-about-investment-research.html 
(last visited Aug. 8, 2007) (claiming that four out of five companies with market caps of $100 
million have no analyst coverage). 
 200. FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 65 n.126. 
 201. Id. (citing 2004 statistics provided by SEC Office of Economic Analysis). 
 202. Susanne Craig, Moving the Market: Firm to Research Stock “Orphans,” WALL ST. J., 
June 7, 2005, at C3. 
 203. IPOHome, Renaissance Capital Study Shows IPOs Are Losing Research Coverage, 
http://www.ipohome.com/press/iporesearch.asp (last visited Aug. 8, 2007) (describing the absence 
of coverage for new IPOs). 
 204. See Joint Press Release, NASAA, NASD, NYAG, NYSE, & SEC, Ten of Nation’s Top 
Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research 
and Investment Banking (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm. 
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remains unclear, as the market continues to adjust to effects of the new 
regulatory structure.  Media reports indicate that, although the prospect of 
obtaining money from the settlement spawned the growth of a number 
of small or boutique research firms, many new firms have been struggling 
since the Wall Street banks chose mostly the larger, independent firms 
to provide their independent research.205  As the Wall Street Journal 
reported, now that the “initial burst of interest” in independent research is 
over, “some independents are getting out, and others are seeing their 
business decline.”206  On the other hand, the most recent report from 
Institutional Investor indicated that the number of firms offering inde-
pendent research has quadrupled since 2003, and that although some of 
the best firms have been driven from the business, others have emerged to 
take their place.207 
The value of the subsidized research is also unclear.  Even with this 
substantial budget, the banks cannot duplicate the research available to 
institutions because many independent analysts are unwilling to dissemi-
nate their research broadly, fearing that participation in the settlement will 
affect the ability to keep their institutional clients.208  Critics also argue that 
the quality of the free research is low because banks are unwilling to pay 
more for research aimed at sophisticated investors.209  Reports on investor 
use of the subsidized research are mixed; some media reports indicate that 
investors are making limited use of the independent research.210 
Industry insiders indicate that “when the five years [of the subsidy] 
are up, the climate may not be so favorable for the independents.”211  
                                                                                                                            
 205. See Judith Burns, Independent Research Hits Snags: Business Isn’t Bustling as SEC May 
Move to Curb Soft Dollar Arrangements, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2004, at C15 (citing a 20 to 30 
percent reduction in the industry). 
 206. Jesse Eisinger, Long & Short: Why Independent Research Is Drying Up, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
8, 2006, at C1. 
 207. See Abramowitz, supra note 191, at 77. 
 208. See Valdmanis, supra note 199, at 1B (quoting several independent firms as stating 
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would detract from the value of their research and cost them institutional clients). 
 209. See Eisinger, supra note 206, at C1. 
 210. See Burns, supra note 10, at B3. 
 211. Chris Kentouris, Seeking Soft Dollar Clarity, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS, Nov. 6, 2006, 
at 4, 4.  The SEC removed one substantial risk when it decided not to require that institutions 
pay cash for third-party research rather than bundling those payments with their brokerage com-
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Exchange Act Release No. 54,165, 71 Fed. Reg. 41,978, 41,993 (July 24, 2006).  Commentators 
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Oster, Small Researchers Face a Threat; Mutual-Fund Industry Proposal on “Soft-Dollars” Could 
End Revenue Source, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2003, at D9 (quoting The Alliance in Support of 
Independent Research, a trade group). 
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Independent analysts may simply lack the capacity to provide sufficient 
information to the market.212  Most independent firms cover a small number 
of companies, and their financial structures do not allow them to pay Wall 
Street levels of analyst compensation.213  Typically, they cannot compete 
with investment banks on features such as offering access to management.214  
Tellingly, despite the reputational fallout from the analyst scandals, the 
settlement subsidy, and the ongoing changes in the industry, Wall Street 
firms still provide more than 95 percent of all research coverage.215 
The extent to which analysts who are not affiliated with invest-
ment banks can properly be characterized as independent also remains 
uncertain.216  As this Article has demonstrates, so-called independent 
analysts may have a variety of business relationships that compromise 
their objectivity.217  Many so-called independent analysts are affiliated with 
mutual funds, and these alliances may lead them to be overly optimistic 
with respect to securities within the funds’ portfolios.218  Analysts who serve 
institutional clients face continued pressure to maintain ratings that 
are favorable to the client’s investment position.219  Several independent 
analysts who sell research to hedge funds have recently been accused of 
                                                                                                                            
 212. See, e.g., Cheryl Winokur Munk & Lynn Cowan, The Stock-Research Pact: 
Independent Firms Aim to Divide Spoils, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2003, at C9 (describing how only the 
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disseminating overly pessimistic information in an effort to make the 
funds’ short selling more profitable.220  Other independent firms trade 
covered securities on a proprietary basis.221  Even the independence of 
Morningstar, one of the prime beneficiaries of the Global Research 
Settlement and a major source of research for the participating investment 
banks, has come under scrutiny for conflicts of interest between its research 
and the financial and consulting services that it provides to issuers.222 
The regulatory reforms have a limited impact on potential conflicts 
that do not involve investment banking.  The Street.com Ratings reported, 
for example, that proprietary trading represented the single largest source 
of revenue for the defendant banks that participated in the Global 
Research Settlement, yet the settlement does not address the incentive 
for analysts to release favorable information on securities owned by the 
banks in order to enhance the profitability of that trading.223  The SRO 
rules require only limited disclosure of noninvestment banking conflicts, 
and that disclosure focuses primarily on proprietary trading by individual 
analysts.224  More importantly, because the regulatory reforms have been 
implemented through SRO rules (and the Global Research Settlement), 
they do not apply to all research analysts.  In particular, the SRO rules 
apply only to NYSE and NASD member firms and their employees.  
Research-only firms that do not function as brokers or dealers are not 
subject to the regulations. 
One might reasonably question whether any of these effects matter.  
Of what importance is a reduction in the amount of sell-side coverage, 
particularly if it was of little value to retail investors?  Institutional investors 
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can continue to purchase research and trade on it.  From a consumer-
protection standpoint, investors may be better off with no information than 
with information that is false or misleading. 
A partial answer to this question is that the explicit purpose of the 
regulatory reforms was to provide investors with reliable information and 
to enhance the role of research analysts as gatekeepers.225  Congress, the 
SEC, and even the U.S. Supreme Court have identified a valuable role for 
research analysts in disseminating information to the market and increas-
ing market efficiency.226  If the reforms cannot achieve this objective, it 
is difficult to justify them.  Furthermore, to the extent that regulatory 
reforms further segment the market for investment information, small 
investors will likely be forced to rely on inferior information sources.  I 
have questioned elsewhere the competence of regulators to identify and 
control investor use of information, but the proven willingness of investors 
to rely on sources such as anonymous chat room postings and emails 
should caution the SEC about shutting down traditional research.227 
Moreover, the changes in the research market have not reduced 
what might have been characterized as excessive coverage; rather, they 
have eliminated coverage for a distinct set of issuers—new and smaller 
companies.  The absence of research coverage increases the cost of capital 
for these firms.228  The higher cost of capital in turn reduces the ability 
of small firms to finance business opportunities.  Large institutional 
investors are less interested in investing in smaller companies because 
of their concerns over information asymmetries and liquidity constraints.  
Although analyst coverage mediates these concerns, the smaller trading 
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volume of these issuers makes it uneconomic for brokerage-affiliated or 
pure research analysts to sell research on these companies.  Significantly, 
subsidizing research through investment banking revenues had offered 
a realistic solution by creating an economic rationale for Wall Street 
firms to cover smaller issuers. 
D. Issuer-Financed Research 
Some small issuers have responded to the lack of analyst coverage 
by paying analysts directly.229  Issuer-paid research, or “pay to play,” seems 
to be a natural market-based response to the reduced coverage of small 
issuers.  Several research firms are marketing their research services 
directly to issuers, claiming that their coverage will improve liquidity and 
stock price.230  Dutton Associates, one of the largest issuer-paid firms, 
charges $39,500, prepaid, for a year of coverage, which consists of four 
quarterly reports.231  Spelman Research, charges $26,500, also prepaid, for 
a research report, which it distributes to 50,000 industry professionals, as 
well as a year of coverage.232  Investrend Research provides a similar type 
of fee-based research, and claims that its analysts are paid to deliver 
reports “to the benefit of the public.”233 
Issuer-paid research has been highly controversial.234  Defenders claim 
that fee-based providers are free of the highly criticized investment-
banking, brokerage, and other business conflicts.  Critics argue that 
commissioned research is inherently conflicted.  The need to generate 
business from other issuers clearly gives commissioned research firms an 
incentive to provide optimistic reports rather than to be critical of covered 
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companies or their management, leading some to call such analysts indis-
tinguishable from stock promoters.  The Wall Street Journal recently 
observed that Dutton has buy-type ratings on 77.5 percent of the stocks it 
covers; Thomson Financial reports that, in the aggregate, 46.5 percent 
of analyst ratings are buys.235  Some fee-based research has been distributed 
without full disclosure that it was paid for by the issuer,236 and some 
firms own stock in covered companies.237  Concerns about the reliability of 
issuer-paid research have led Thomson Financial to begin excluding paid-
for research from its consensus earnings and recommendations,238 although 
seven firms, including Dutton, were “grandfathered in” and continue to 
contribute research on 145 companies.239 
A number of issuer-paid providers have attempted to address concerns 
about the reliability of issuer-paid research by banding together into the 
FIRST Research Consortium.240  The Consortium issued standards for 
independent research providers that include various measures of independ-
ence, full disclosure of financial considerations, and the requirement that 
analysts not own or trade covered securities.241  Similar guidelines were 
jointly released by the CFA Center for Financial Market Integrity and the 
National Investor Relations Institute.242  The extent to which analysts will 
adhere to these standards—which are not binding—remains unclear.243 
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In 2005, Reuters and NASDAQ created a joint venture called the 
Independent Research Network (IRN).244  The IRN was designed to act 
as an intermediary between independent research providers and issuers.245  
Under the IRN model, issuers pay the IRN for coverage and the IRN 
selects the research providers, who are not then in the awkward position 
of critically evaluating the firm and managers that have selected them.246  
The explicit objective of the IRN was to mitigate analyst conflicts of 
interest.247  Regulators determined that under certain conditions, the IRN 
would be allowed to serve as an independent research provider under the 
terms of the Global Research Settlement.248  The market did not appear, 
however, to accept the model.249  Reuters recently announced that the IRN 
was being shut down “due to weak demand from investors.”250 
V. AN ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY APPROACH 
The foregoing analysis suggests that efforts by regulators to improve 
information quality in the capital markets have had predictable and 
undesirable effects.  Current regulations were premised upon a link between 
analyst conflicts and research quality that is not borne out by empirical 
research.  More recent studies fail to demonstrate that mandatory 
independence has made research more reliable.  The market for research 
has become increasingly segmented; institutional investors have access to 
highly sophisticated and costly information sources, while retail investors 
are receiving less information than ever.  At the same time, the reforms 
have dramatically reduced coverage of small issuers, making it more difficult 
for them to access the public capital markets.  As this Article explains, given 
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the economic structure of equity research, there is little reason to believe 
that high-quality objective research can be provided to public investors 
on a cost-effective basis absent subsidization of that research through busi-
ness relationships that potentially compromise analyst independence. 
One possible solution is to provide alternative sources of research 
financing.  In prior work with Stephen Choi, I argued for a system of 
issuer-based financing that would place control over resource allocation in 
the hands of shareholders.251  The IRN reflected a similar approach, although 
it lacked our proposal’s market discipline over research quality. 
If the markets are to rely on third-party providers both to supply 
research and to finance that research, then a mandate of analyst 
independence is unrealistic.  Based on existing evidence, it is also 
unnecessary.  Instead, the solution is to manage rather than eliminate 
so-called conflicts of interest.  This Part introduces a two-part mechanism 
for managing analyst conflicts.  Subpart V.A proposes a requirement of 
analyst registration.  Subpart V.B describes the creation of a new SEC 
Analyst Website, SECAW. 
This Article advocates SECAW as an alternative regulatory approach 
that would substitute for the existing government-mandated independence.  
For institutional investors, neither the current regulatory restrictions 
nor SECAW are necessary; institutional investors can adequately address 
analyst conflicts by contract.  For retail investors, the disclosure effected 
through SECAW addresses collective action problems and provides 
increased transparency.  In addition, by increasing the reliability of analyst 
research, by allowing firms to subsidize that research through other, 
properly disclosed business operations, and by lowering the costs of 
disseminating that research broadly, the proposal is likely to increase 
coverage of small issuers.  Finally, the markets as a whole will benefit 
from better information with which to judge the value of research. 
A. Analyst Registration 
Registration is a commonly used tool in securities regulation.  The 
Securities Act of 1933252 introduced the registration requirement—a 
cornerstone in the regulation of the securities markets—in connection with 
the public offering process.  As Louis Brandeis explained in support of 
the disclosure-based approach to regulation: “Sunlight is said to be the 
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best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”253  Felix 
Frankfurter, who was largely responsible for overseeing the creation of 
the federal regulatory scheme, embraced this philosophy and used it as 
the basis of federal securities regulation.254  Although the disclosure-
based regime has been criticized,255 it is widely credited with “improved 
selection of new investment projects, improved managerial performance, 
and reduced investor risk.”256  As Merritt Fox observed, despite repeated 
debates over whether market forces will produce an optimal level of 
disclosure without regulation, “even most economics-oriented legal 
academics” conclude that mandatory disclosure is desirable.257 
The registration requirement has been extended beyond issuers; the 
Investment Company Act of 1940258 requires mutual funds to register with 
the SEC and to disclose their investment positions and financial 
condition.259  Registration is also used to regulate securities professionals.  
Section 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934260 requires broker-
dealers to register with the SEC.261  The Investment Advisors Act of 1940262 
requires nonexempt investment advisors to register.263 
Research analysts are not now and never have been subject to a 
registration requirement.  Although many analysts are employed by reg-
istered broker-dealers, the broker-dealer disclosure requirements are not 
tailored to specific issues concerning analyst reliability and performance, 
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nor is broker-dealer disclosure made at the level of individual analysts.264  
Additionally, these requirements do not apply to analysts who are not 
employed by broker-dealers. 
Registration is less intrusive than substantive regulation.265  By 
establishing a registration requirement, the SEC can more easily monitor 
the accuracy and completeness of conflict disclosure.266  Allowing analysts 
to disclose rather than eliminate conflicts would enable firms to cross-
subsidize research through other business activities, including investment 
banking and brokerage.  At the same time, disclosure would allow the 
market, rather than the regulators, to evaluate the extent to which these 
activities compromise the quality or integrity of the research. 
Congress could impose a registration requirement by statute, but this 
Article advocates that the SEC exercise its rulemaking authority to 
require analyst registration.  Section 501 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
explicitly authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules addressed to analyst 
conflicts of interest.267  Importantly, the statute is not, by its terms, limited 
to investment banking conflicts or to analysts affiliated with investment 
banks or broker dealers.  Thus, by promulgating a registration requirement 
under the authority of section 501, the SEC could identify and address 
conflicts involving unaffiliated or “independent” analysts—analysts who 
fall outside the scope of the current regulations. 
Because, as indicated above,268 institutional investors do not require 
regulatory protection from analyst conflicts of interest, this Article 
proposes that the registration requirement apply only to analysts who 
provide their research to the investing public, directly or indirectly.  
Analysts who provide research directly to the public by releasing reports 
or recommendations to the media, appearing on talk shows, or posting 
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information on a publicly accessible website, blog, or chat room, would be 
required to register.  Analysts who provide research to an intermediary 
such as Thomson First Call or directly to an issuer, would be required to 
register if the intermediary will release the information to the public.  The 
registration requirement would further apply to analysts who release 
information to a sufficiently large number of customers or subscribers 
that the information will foreseeably make its way into the public domain 
and affect the securities markets.  A reasonable threshold would require 
registration by analysts who disseminate information to one thousand 
or more investors.269  Analysts who provide research exclusively to their 
employers, such as those analysts employed by mutual funds or hedge 
funds, as well as analysts who provide research to a limited number of 
institutional clients, would not be required to register. 
What would the registration requirement entail?  The primary 
objective of the registration requirement would be to obtain disclosure 
of any business relationships by the analyst or the analyst’s employer that 
could potentially influence the analyst’s research.  As detailed earlier in 
this Article,270 those business relationships include investment banking, 
brokerage, asset management (directly or through affiliates), and proprie-
tary trading.  In addition to requiring that the analyst identify himself or 
herself and the analyst’s employer, the registration requirement would 
require the analyst to identify all such business relationships in which 
the analyst or the analyst’s employer is engaged.  The analyst would also 
be required to provide a breakdown, by revenue, of how the firm’s research 
and brokerage services are distributed between retail and institutional 
clients, to describe special services provided to institutional investors, and 
to identify whether the firm receives payment in the form of soft dollars.  
The analyst would be required to disclose pending and prior disputes 
concerning the accuracy of his or her research and any allegations of a 
failure to disclose conflicts of interest—this disclosure would include 
litigation and customer arbitration proceedings.  Finally, the analyst would 
be required to identify any other material business relationships. 
The information provided through the registration process would be 
made available to investors and the markets through the SECAW, as set 
forth in Subpart V.B below.  It would also enable the SEC to gain a better 
understanding of the market structure by providing information on analysts 
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outside the traditional investment banking and brokerage firms who 
disseminate research to public investors. 
B. SECAW: The SEC Analyst Website 
The second component of this Article’s proposal for managing ana-
lyst conflicts of interest is the creation of a research analyst website.  
The Article proposes that the SEC create a website providing the public 
with access both to the information provided through the analyst 
registration process and to current and historical analyst research.271  The 
website, known as SECAW, would provide investors and the market with 
a single public source for information about analysts, their recommenda-
tions, and potential conflicts of interest.  The website would enable 
investors to track down and evaluate information disseminated through 
talk show appearances, chat rooms, and press reports.  In addition, the 
website would serve as a source of historical information, enabling 
the market more readily to evaluate analyst performance. 
SECAW would contain three types of information.  First, SECAW 
would contain background information and business relationships relating 
to each individual analyst, which would be obtained from the analyst’s 
registration filing.  Second, analysts would be required to post real-
time information concerning any recommendation, earnings estimate, or 
price target disseminated directly or indirectly to the public.272  This 
posting would be required on the first date that the information is released 
to the public and would include the opening price of the covered 
security on the date of the posting.  Analysts would not be required to 
post their full research reports, but would be required to disclose whether 
a report had been prepared and to identify those to whom the report is 
available, such as customers or subscribers. 
Third, analysts would be required to list any relationships specific to 
the covered company, including prior employment, whether the company 
has been an investment banking client within the past year, and whether 
the firm has pitched for investment banking business within the past year.  
To address the differential treatment of institutional and individual 
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investors, the analyst would be required to disclose whether the analyst or 
its firm provided the posted information to any clients prior to its public 
release and, if so, to identify the date that the posted information had 
first been provided to clients.  The analyst would have to identify any 
personal ownership of or derivative positions in the covered securities, 
and any personal trading within a six-month period prior to the posting.  
The analyst’s firm would also be required to disclose whether it has a 
proprietary position (long or short) in the covered securities and the 
approximate size of that position. 
SECAW would be maintained in such a way as to provide both 
current and historical information about analyst research.  Analyst post-
ings would be retained on the site for a twelve-month period, enabling the 
market to evaluate performance of prior recommendations, consistency, 
and changes in coverage.  Analysts and their firms would also be required 
to identify any changes to the posted information on a real-time basis.  
Thus, if a firm, subsequent to the analyst’s posting, purchased covered 
securities or was retained to perform investment banking services, that 
information would be added to the website.  Similarly, individual ana-
lysts would be able to sell covered securities, such as for liquidity reasons, 
without running afoul of the current prohibition on trading inconsistent 
with a recommendation.273 
The mechanics of the website could be handled by establishing an 
account for each individual analyst in connection with the registration 
process.  Once the SEC set up the account, analysts could be given the 
ability to post their research directly to the website.  This mechanism would 
reduce the administrative costs of the website and facilitate prompt 
market access to the information.  Incorporation of a standard search 
engine would allow users of the site to obtain information on individual 
analysts, compare analyst information on specific securities, and track 
analyst performance over time. 
                                                                                                                            
 273. This would address the problem apparently faced by Brad Hintz, who seemingly wanted 
to realize substantial gains and diversify his portfolio, but was unable to do so because of the 
firm’s favorable rating on the subject securities.  Press Release, NASD, Sanford C. Bernstein & 
Co., Research Analyst Brad Hintz Fined $550,000 for Violations of Research Analyst Conflict of 
Interest Rules (Feb. 8, 2006), available at http://www.nasd.com/PressRoom/NewsReleases/ 
2006NewsReleases/NASDW_015940. 
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C. The Advantages of SECAW 
SECAW would greatly increase information flow to public investors.  
It would enable investors to verify research, identify potential conflicts 
of interest, and evaluate analyst performance.  In particular, SECAW 
would respond to the fact that retail investors often obtain access to 
analyst research through secondary sources: television shows, press 
reports, or the Internet.  Current disclosure requirements are largely 
tied to analyst’s formal report—but an individual investor may learn of 
the analyst’s recommendation or price target without ever seeing that 
report and thus without learning of potential conflicts of interest.  SECAW 
would offer the investor a single reliable source to verify the reported 
information, identify potential conflicts, and review the analyst’s track 
record with respect to other recommendations. 
SECAW could also be used to increase investor information concerning 
bundled or consensus recommendations.  A number of organizations, most 
prominently Thomson Financial’s First Call, bundle analyst recommen-
dations and forecasts together to produce a consensus figure that is then 
disseminated broadly to public investors without information on the 
individual analysts who have supplied the underlying information.274  
Investors using the consensus figures do not know the composition of 
the analysts whose forecasts were combined, the conflicts or business 
relationships that those analysts might have, or the performance history 
of the analysts.275  One solution might involve requiring Thomson and 
similar services to identify, by name, the analysts whose recommendations 
are included in its consensus figures.  Investors could then obtain detailed 
information about those analysts from SECAW.  This approach would 
relieve Thomson of any obligation to collect and disclose analyst-specific 
information to investors. 
SECAW would facilitate the market’s ability to evaluate research 
quality and analyst performance.  It would enable private service providers 
to compile information on analyst performance by giving those service 
                                                                                                                            
 274. See Green, supra note 37, at 4 (explaining the methodology used by Thomson to compile 
consensus figures). 
 275. Thomson, for example, accepts forecasts from any analyst who works for a major 
brokerage firm.  PAUL GLASSERMAN & COSTIS MAGLARAS, ANALYZING THE ANALYSTS 2 
(2001), available at http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/pglasserman/B6014/TheAnalysts.pdf.  
Thomson does not, however, include research from issuer-paid analysts, except for a few firms 
that were grandfathered in.  See Belitski, supra note 238 (describing Thomson’s exclusion of 
issuer-paid research); Richardson, supra note 235, at C1 (describing Thomson’s decision to 
continue including research provided by Dutton and several other firms). 
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providers a comprehensive source of analyst recommendations.  Importantly, 
SECAW would offer a new and centralized source of data on the quality 
and value of publicly distributed research.  With this data, investors could 
better determine the extent to which they should base their investment 
decisions on analyst recommendations, and regulators could better appraise 
the extent to which equity research enhances market efficiency. 
SECAW would also allow the market and academic researchers to 
evaluate the effect of analyst conflicts and business relationships.  The D.C. 
Circuit recently struck down the SEC’s rules requiring greater independ-
ence of mutual fund directors, criticizing the factual predicate of the SEC’s 
rulemaking.276  In particular, the court found that the SEC had failed 
adequately to consider the costs of its new rules and to evaluate a 
disclosure-only alternative.277  Mandated analyst independence has been 
imposed through a combination of SRO rules and the Global Research 
Settlement and is therefore not subject to the same type of procedural 
attack.  Nonetheless, as discussed in Part II above, the empirical evidence 
to date has failed to establish a strong justification for mandated inde-
pendence.278  SECAW responds directly to this deficiency by offering 
researchers access to information on a broader set of analysts as well as 
detailed information on analysts’ conflicts and performance.  As a result, 
SECAW will enable researchers to focus specifically on the extent to which 
independence is a good proxy for reliability.  Ultimately, regulators will be 
better able to justify the case, if any, for substantive regulation. 
SECAW would also increase analyst accountability.  The filing and 
public disclosure requirements would increase the visibility of analyst 
conflicts.  This increased visibility would likely temper an analyst’s willing-
ness to release research to further investment banking or other business 
interests if that research lacked sufficient support or was inconsistent with 
internal information.  In addition, the historical component of the 
website would counteract the market’s focus on short-term performance.  
The relative permanence of historical data would also limit an analyst’s 
ability to retreat from a losing position by terminating coverage. 
                                                                                                                            
 276. U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143–45 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 277. Id. 
 278. See also Fisch, supra note 76, at 81 (criticizing regulators for attempting to determine 
appropriate information sources for investors). 
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D. Possible Criticisms 
The combination of analyst registration and SECAW offers a 
disclosure-based alternative to mandated independence.  The specific 
advantages of the approach advocated by this Article are increased trans-
parency over the regulatory environment that existed in the prescandal 
period, and the ability for firms to continue to subsidize research through 
other business relationships.  A disclosure-based system has disadvantages 
as well as advantages, however.  This Subpart anticipates and responds to 
possible criticisms. 
1. Investor Hubris 
One of the most powerful criticisms of the disclosure-based approaches 
to investor protection is that disclosure is ineffective.  Critics argue that 
the securities laws mandate disclosure that is too extensive or complex 
and that investors are incapable of evaluating the information they 
receive.  Behavioral economists have identified a variety of biases that 
interfere with rational investor decisionmaking.  Retail investors are likely 
to be overconfident, causing them possibly to pay insufficient attention to 
the risk that analyst conflicts of interest will cause research to be overly 
optimistic.  Disclosure may be a particularly ineffective response in that 
overconfident investors will simply disregard warnings of these risks, 
believing that they are meant for someone else.279 
I have argued elsewhere that, despite the shortcomings of a disclosure-
based regime, it is likely to be preferable to more paternalistic substantive 
regulation.280  A more affirmative case can be made, however, in favor of 
disclosure.  As this Article demonstrates, the purpose of analyst regulation 
is largely the protection of retail investors.  As such, the regulatory scheme 
can be understood in terms of consumer protection.  The government’s 
approach to consumer protection has relied heavily on disclosure, in 
part because it operates as an adjunct to rather than as a substitute for 
market discipline over price and quality, and in part because one of the 
objectives of consumer protection is enhanced choice.281  Thus, for example, 
                                                                                                                            
 279. Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853, 880 
(1995); see also Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: 
Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 187–88 
(2006) (criticizing disclosure-based securities regulation for failing to address investor irrationality). 
 280. Fisch, supra note 76. 
 281. James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures: A Behavioral 
Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907, 930–31 (2005). 
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regulation of the mutual fund industry, which is mainly designed to 
protect retail investors, has focused primarily on disclosure, with regula-
tory reforms addressed largely to enhancing investor use and understanding 
of that disclosure.282 
The mutual fund analogy also demonstrates one of the risks associated 
with the increasing segmentation of the market for research.  To the 
extent that relatively informed investors participate in a market, their 
knowledge and expertise enhances market discipline, which in turn allows 
uninformed participants to free ride and enjoy market efficiencies.  If 
informed investors participate in a distinct market, however, by purchas-
ing different products or services from those sold to retail investors, the 
uninformed market may operate inefficiently.283  Thus, because SECAW 
enhances the availability of sell-side research for both institutional and 
retail investors, it increases the likelihood that the reputational and 
other disciplines of institutional clientele will increase the incentives 
for analysts to post accurate information. 
2. Regulatory Intervention Is Unnecessary 
A second and powerful concern is that, if the information described 
in this proposal is valuable, the market can be expected to supply that 
information without regulatory intervention.  Analysts at Wall Street 
                                                                                                                            
 282. See id. (identifying problems with investor use of investment information); cf. Eric D. 
Roiter, An Apology for Mutual Funds: Delivering Fiduciary Services to Middle and Working 
Class Investors, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 851, 860 (2004) (“Some issues should more 
properly be seen as customer or consumer issues.  The traditional approach in this respect 
is promoting effective disclosure and informed choices by consumers, rather than imposi-
tion of corporate governance rules or, for that matter, creation of new fiduciary duties.”).  
Concededly, the effectiveness of mutual fund disclosure has been mixed, but many of those 
failures can be attributed to flaws in the disclosure process.  See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, 
The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 834–35 (1995) (observing 
that it took the SEC twenty years to require disclosure of the identities of those persons 
making investment decisions for the fund); Douglas Litowitz, The Corporation as God, 30 J. 
CORP. L. 501, 526 (2005) (quoting former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt describing mutual fund 
disclosures as “impossible to understand”).  Notably, studies suggest that the most prob-
lematic mutual fund investment patterns are in broker-directed investments, in which 
investors appear to rely on professional advice as an alternative to reviewing disclosure.  
See, e.g., Bergstresser et al., supra note 59, at 36 (finding that funds sold through brokers 
have higher fees and lower returns). 
 283. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in 
Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 
83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1034 (2005) (suggesting that segmentation of the mutual fund 
market may prevent institutional investors from disciplining fees and returns in funds marketed 
primarily to retail investors). 
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firms are already providing increased disclosure of their compensation 
and conflicts of interest.  And several firms are already supplying retail 
investors with analyst ratings and other performance information. 
Historically, information on analyst performance has been very 
limited.  Institutional Investor magazine has ranked analysts for years, but 
its rankings were based on polls of institutional investors, not on actual 
analyst performance.284  More recently, private organizations such as 
Investars and StarMine started to compile information on analyst perform-
ance and to create analyst rating systems.285  Most of this information is only 
available to institutional investors, but some is available to individual retail 
investors.286  Nonetheless, retail investor access to these ratings remains 
limited.287  Some data providers have reportedly refused to provide informa-
tion to analyst ranking services, citing analyst reluctance to be rated.288  
Many analysts are not included in the ranking services, particularly inde-
pendent analysts.289  One report stated that fewer than half of the 
independent analysts providing research as part of the Global Research 
Settlement are publicly ranked on their performance.290  Finally, and 
                                                                                                                            
 284. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 16, at 1053 n.107 (describing the methodology of 
Institutional Investor magazine’s analyst rating system); Xi Li, Performance, Herding, and Career 
Concerns of Individual Financial Analysts (EFA 2002 Berlin Meetings Discussion Paper, Jan. 15, 
2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=300889 (explaining that analyst rankings are based 
primarily on reputation and recognition). 
 285. See Melissa Lee & John Metaxas, Quality of Analysis Gradually Improving; Firms 
Publishing Accuracy of Research Predictions, CNBC, Apr. 30, 2004, available at http://www.investars.com/ 
articles/article30042004.asp (describing Investars as one of many firms now supplying performance-
based analyst rankings). 
 286. For example, Investars offers some performance information to retail investors but 
its Internal Performance Measurement platform is sold to institutional clients.  See Investars, 
http://www.investars.com/synopsis.asp.  StarMine used to provide free limited information 
to retail investors, but discontinued that service in favor of selling a more complete service to 
portfolio managers and other professional investors.  See StarMine, http://www.starmine.com/ 
index.phtml?page_set=investor (last visited Aug. 8, 2007) (explaining that StarMine’s analyst 
rating service for individual investors has been discontinued because it was “currently focusing 
[its] resources on [its] institutional-grade StarMine Professional research service”).  Some of 
StarMine’s information is also available free through Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com/ 
q/sa?s=YHOO (last visited Aug. 8, 2007). 
 287. A further existing limitation is that analyst ratings, when available, are not provided 
to investors together with the analyst’s recommendation and report, creating search costs.  
SECAW would provide a readily identifiable and reliable source of this information. 
 288. See Alistair Barr, Rating the Independent Researchers; Despite Restrictions, Some 
Researchers Are Tracked, CBS MARKETWATCH, Aug. 6, 2004, available at http://www.investars.com/ 
articles/article08062004-2.asp (stating that the independent firms restrict rating service access to 
the necessary information if the service is going to provide ratings to retail investors). 
 289. See Barr, supra note 92 (explaining that independent research providers are not 
required to disclose their recommendations or their performance). 
 290. Barr, supra note 288. 
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perhaps most importantly, the principles described above concerning the 
market for research apply equally to the market for evaluating research 
quality.  Firms are able to sell their information on analyst performance to 
institutional investors, but only to the extent that the firms do not make 
the information available at little or no cost to the public.  As a result, firms 
such as StarMine have discontinued their services for retail investors in 
favor of their institutional clientele.291 
3. Political Viability 
A third concern is that the registration and disclosure requirements 
of SECAW are not politically viable and that, in particular, the research 
industry will object to the requirements.  Although the disclosure require-
ments are not cost free, there are reasons to believe that they are actually 
consistent with analysts’ business interests as well as those of the markets.  
First, substituting disclosure requirements for substantive regulation 
restores flexibility for research firms in funding and subsidizing analyst 
research.  Firms that are able to exploit synergies between their business 
operations, such as between research and investment banking, will be able 
to benefit from those synergies as long as they disclose the relationships.  
The market, in turn, will be in a better position to evaluate the effect of 
the relationship. 
Second, SECAW will increase the distribution and visibility of analyst 
research.  Widespread distribution of analyst research (at least after pre-
ferred and institutional clients have been given access) serves the needs 
of issuers and institutional investors by increasing sales, generating 
demand, and driving up stock prices.  Indeed, one of the problems with 
the issuer-financed model is the risk that no one will read the resulting 
reports.  Ironically, by enabling low-cost distribution and comparison of 
analyst information, SECAW may serve as a mechanism for allowing 
the market to test the issuer-financed model. 
Third, SECAW may offer a justification for reevaluating the appro-
priate nature and scope of analyst liability exposure for securities fraud.  
Under current law, the liability exposure of research analysts remains 
unpredictable.  Although courts have dismissed a number of lawsuits against 
analysts and their firms arising out of the collapse of the technology bubble, 
                                                                                                                            
 291. See supra note 286 (describing StarMine’s decision to stop providing free analyst 
ratings to retail investors). 
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other cases remain.292  Class actions premised on the fraud on the market 
theory—in which class members do not need to establish reliance on 
analyst misstatements—offer the potential for particularly large exposure.  
Although exploring the various arguments regarding litigation reform is 
beyond the scope of this Article, SECAW offers a vehicle for exploring 
alternative mechanisms to traditional class action litigation for increas-
ing analyst accountability.  One possibility, for example, that would 
increase analyst incentives for candor on SECAW would be to establish 
a safe harbor from fraud liability for information that is properly 
disclosed.  Another possibility would be to exploit the reduced enforcement 
costs associated with SECAW’s transparency by replacing private 
litigation against analysts with SEC enforcement.293  These alternatives 
to traditional litigation would likely be welcomed by the research 
community, would be consistent with the goal of enhancing information 
flow in the securities markets, and would eliminate the difficult questions 
about loss causation and damages that have plagued private civil litiga-
tion against analysts. 
CONCLUSION 
In a time when public confidence in the markets is low, it is tempting 
for regulators to seek to offer investors greater protection against losses.  
The analyst scandals enabled regulators and the investing public to 
scapegoat research analysts for failing to operate as reliable gatekeepers and 
led to reforms that attempted to establish a gatekeeping role by mandating 
analyst independence. 
It is unclear whether the reforms have had the effect of making sell-
side research more reliable.  In particular, the existing reforms contain 
substantial gaps in coverage, leaving analysts with continued incentives to 
issue overly optimistic recommendations.  Several effects of the reforms 
are undisputed, however—they have reduced the quantity of research 
                                                                                                                            
 292. One recent example is a pending class action against Credit Suisse and its analysts 
in connection with research about America Online (AOL).  The district court recently 
rejected the defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently 
alleged both transaction and loss causation.  In re Credit Suisse-AOL Sec. Litig., No. 02-
12146-NG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86363 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2006). 
 293. The extent to which public enforcement or criminal litigation serves as a substitute 
for private civil liability is beyond the scope of this Article.  For an analysis of the interplay 
and potentially complementary roles of government enforcement actions and private civil 
litigation, see Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 167, 198–202. 
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available to the market in general and retail investors in particular, they 
have reduced coverage for smaller issuers, and they have increased the 
segmentation between institutional and retail investors. 
This Article demonstrates that these effects were predictable; by 
reducing firms’ ability to subsidize research through other business 
activities, the reforms have eliminated a key source of funding, particularly 
the funding of coverage for new and smaller issuers.  By reducing firms’ 
ability to exploit synergies between research and other business activities, 
the reforms may also be reducing information quality. 
This Article advocates an alternative to mandated independence—
managing analyst conflicts of interest.  The Article has proposed that the 
SEC require registration by analysts who disseminate information to 
the investing public coupled with public disclosure of analyst recommenda-
tions, conflicts, and other information relevant to an assessment of the 
reliability of the analyst’s research.  By substituting analyst registration 
and SECAW for the mandatory independence required by existing law, the 
SEC would provide firms with the flexibility to finance quality research.  
At the same time, SECAW would enhance the transparency of that 
research, enabling investors and the market—rather than regulators—to 
evaluate research quality. 
